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I. Introduction 
Chaka Fattah, Sr., a powerful and prominent fixture 
in Philadelphia politics, financially overextended himself 
in both his personal life and his professional career during 
an ultimately unsuccessful run for mayor. Fattah received 
a substantial illicit loan to his mayoral campaign and used 
his political influence and personal connections to engage 
friends, employees, and others in an elaborate series of 
schemes aimed at preserving his political status by hiding 
the source of the illicit loan and its repayment. In so doing, 
Fattah and his allies engaged in shady and, at times, illegal 
behavior, including the misuse of federal grant money and 
federal appropriations, the siphoning of money from 
nonprofit organizations to pay campaign debts, and the 
misappropriation of campaign funds to pay personal 
obligations. 
Based upon their actions, Fattah and four of his 
associates—Herbert Vederman, Robert Brand, Bonnie 
Bowser, and Karen Nicholas—were charged with 
numerous criminal acts in a twenty-nine count indictment. 
After a jury trial, each was convicted on multiple counts. 
All but Bowser appealed. As we explain below, the 
District Court’s judgment will be affirmed in part and 
reversed in part. 
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II. Background1 
During the 1980s and ’90s, Fattah served in both 
houses of the Pennsylvania General Assembly, first as a 
member of the House of Representatives and later as a 
Senator. In 1995, Fattah was elected to the United States 
House of Representatives for Pennsylvania’s Second 
Congressional District. In 2006, Fattah launched an 
unsuccessful run for Mayor of Philadelphia, setting in 
motion the events that would lead to his criminal 
conviction and resignation from Congress ten years later. 
A. The Fattah for Mayor Scheme 
Fattah declared his candidacy for mayor in 
November of 2006. Thomas Lindenfeld, a political 
consultant on Fattah’s exploratory committee, believed 
that “[a]t the beginning of the campaign, [Fattah] was a 
considerable . . . candidate and somebody who had a very 
likely chance of success.” JA1618. But Fattah’s campaign 
soon began to experience difficulties, particularly with 
fundraising. Philadelphia had adopted its first-ever 
campaign contribution limits, which limited contributions 
to $2,500 from individuals and $10,000 from political 
action committees and certain types of business 
organizations. Fattah’s fundraising difficulties led him to 
                                              
1 The facts are drawn from the trial record unless otherwise 
noted. 
10 
seek a substantial loan, far in excess of the new 
contribution limits. 
1. The Lord Loan and Its Repayment 
While serving in Congress, Fattah became 
acquainted with Albert Lord, II. The two first met around 
1998, when Lord was a member of the Board of Directors 
of Sallie Mae. 
As the May 15, 2007 primary date for the 
Philadelphia mayoral race approached, Fattah met Lord to 
ask for assistance, telling Lord that the Fattah for Mayor 
(FFM) campaign was running low on funds. Fattah asked 
Lord to meet with Thomas Lindenfeld, a political 
consultant in Washington, D.C., and part-owner of LSG 
Strategies, Inc. (Strategies), a company that was working 
with the FFM campaign and that specialized in direct voter 
contact initiatives. Lindenfeld had been part of the 
exploratory group that initially considered Fattah’s 
viability as a candidate for mayor. Lindenfeld had known 
Fattah since 1999, when Fattah endorsed Philadelphia 
Mayor John Street. Through Fattah, Lindenfeld had also 
gotten to know several of Fattah’s associates, including 
Herbert Vederman, Robert Brand, and Bonnie Bowser. 
Herbert Vederman, a businessman and former state 
official, was the finance director for the FFM campaign. 
Robert Brand owned Solutions for Progress (Solutions), a 
“Philadelphia-based public policy technology company, 
whose mission [was] to deliver technology that directly 
assists low and middle income families [in obtaining] 
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public benefits.” JA6551. Bowser was Fattah’s Chief of 
Staff and campaign treasurer, and served in his district 
office in Philadelphia. 
Lord’s assistant contacted Lindenfeld to arrange a 
meeting, and Lindenfeld informed Fattah that he would be 
meeting with Lord. Lindenfeld, along with his partner, 
Michael Matthews, met with Lord and discussed Fattah’s 
need for funds to mount an intensive media campaign. 
After that meeting, Lindenfeld reported to Fattah that Lord 
wanted to help, but that they had not discussed a specific 
dollar amount. Approximately a week later, Fattah 
instructed Lindenfeld to meet with Lord a second time. 
Lord “wanted to know if he could give a substantial 
amount of money, a million dollars” to Fattah’s campaign. 
JA1630. That prompted Lindenfeld to reply that the 
amount “would be beyond the campaign finance limits.” 
Id. 
Lord proposed a solution: he offered to instead give 
a million dollars to Strategies in the form of a loan. To that 
end, Lindenfeld had a promissory note drafted which 
specified that Lord was lending Strategies $1 million, and 
that Strategies promised to repay the $1 million at 9.25% 
interest, with repayment to commence January 31, 2008. 
Lindenfeld later acknowledged that the promissory note 
would make it appear as though Lord’s $1 million was not 
a contribution directly to the Congressman, although he 
knew that it was actually a loan to the FFM campaign. 
Indeed, Lindenfeld confirmed with Fattah that neither 
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Lindenfeld nor Strategies would be responsible for 
repayment. With that understanding, Lindenfeld executed 
both the note and a security agreement purporting to 
encumber Strategies’ accounts receivable and all its assets. 
On May 1, shortly before the primary election, Lord 
wired $1 million to Lindenfeld. Lindenfeld held the money 
in Strategies’ operating account until Fattah told him how 
it was to be spent. Some of the money was eventually used 
for print materials mailed directly to voters. And, at 
Fattah’s direction, Lindenfeld wired a substantial sum to 
Sydney Lei and Associates (SLA), a company owned by 
Gregory Naylor which specialized in “get out the vote” 
efforts. 
Naylor had known Fattah for more than 30 years.2 
During the campaign, Naylor worked as the field director 
and was in charge of getting out the vote on election day. 
                                              
2 Naylor first worked with Fattah when he was in the state 
legislature. When Fattah was elected to Congress, Naylor 
worked in his Philadelphia office. Naylor met Nicholas 
when she joined Fattah’s staff at some point in the 1990s. 
After concluding her employment with Fattah’s office, 
Nicholas worked with the Educational Advancement 
Alliance (EAA), an education nonprofit entity founded by 
Fattah. This entity helped to recruit underrepresented 
students for scholarship and college opportunities. Around 
2009, Naylor left Fattah’s office to work exclusively with 
SLA. Naylor also knew Brand. 
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On the final day of the campaign, Naylor worked with 
Vederman, who allowed Naylor to use his credit card to 
rent vans that would transport Fattah voters to the polls. 
As the primary date neared, Fattah and Naylor knew 
the campaign was running out of money. The campaign 
was unable to finance “media buys,” and Naylor needed 
money for field operations to cover Philadelphia’s more 
than one thousand polling places. In early May, 
Lindenfeld called Naylor to say that Lindenfeld “would be 
sending some money [Naylor’s] way.” JA3057. Within 
days, SLA received a six-figure sum for Naylor to use in 
the campaign and on election day. Naylor used the money 
to pay some outstanding bills, including salaries for FFM 
employees, and allocated $200,000 to field operations for 
election day. 
Fattah lost the mayoral primary on May 15, 2007. 
Afterward, Lindenfeld spoke with Fattah, Naylor and 
Bowser about accounting for the FFM campaign money 
from Lord that had been spent. They decided that the 
amounts should not appear in the FFM campaign finance 
reports, and Fattah instructed Naylor to have his firm, 
SLA, create an invoice. Naylor did so, creating an invoice 
dated June 1, 2007 from SLA to FFM, seeking payment of 
$193,580.19. Naylor later acknowledged that the FFM 
campaign did not actually owe money to SLA, and that the 
false invoice was created to “hide the transaction that took 
place earlier” and “make it look like [SLA] was owed 
money.” JA3075–76. Although FFM did not owe SLA 
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anything for the election day expenses, the FFM campaign 
finance reports from 2009 through 2013 listed a $20,000 
in-kind contribution from SLA for each year, thereby 
lowering FFM’s alleged outstanding debt to SLA. 
Of the total $1 million Lord loan, $400,000 had not 
been spent. Lindenfeld returned that sum to Lord on June 
3, 2007. He included a cover letter which stated: “As it 
turns out the business opportunities we had contemplated 
do not seem to be as fruitful as previously expected.” 
JA1254. Lindenfeld later admitted that there were no such 
“business opportunities” and that the letter was simply an 
effort to conceal the loan. 
In late 2007, faced with financial pressures, Lord 
asked his son, Albert Lord, III, to collect the outstanding 
$600,000 balance on the loan to Strategies. Lord III 
contacted Lindenfeld about repayment and expressed a 
willingness to forgive the interest owed if the principal 
was paid. Lindenfeld immediately called Fattah and 
informed him that repayment could not be put off any 
longer. Fattah told Lindenfeld more than once that “[h]e 
would take care of it,” JA1652, but Fattah did not act. 
Needing someone who might have Fattah’s ear, 
Lindenfeld reached out to Naylor and Bowser. Naylor 
talked to Fattah on several occasions and told him that 
Lindenfeld was under considerable pressure to repay the 
loan. Fattah told Naylor more than once that he was 
“working on it.” JA3082–83. 
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During his political career, Fattah had focused on 
education, especially for the underprivileged. Indeed, 
Fattah founded two nonprofit organizations: College 
Opportunity Resources for Education (CORE), and the 
Educational Advancement Alliance (EAA). 
EAA held the annual Fattah Conference on Higher 
Education (the “annual conference”) to acquaint high 
school students with higher education options. JA3079. 
Sallie Mae regularly sponsored the conference. According 
to Raymond Jones, EAA’s chairman of the board from 
2004 through 2007, EAA offered a variety of programs to 
provide “marginalized students with educational 
opportunities so they could continue and go to college.” 
JA1360. EAA was funded with federal grant money which 
could only be spent for the purposes described in the 
particular grant. Karen Nicholas served as EAA’s 
executive director, handling the organization’s day-to-day 
administrative responsibilities. Nicholas had previously 
been a staffer for Fattah when he was a member of 
Pennsylvania’s House of Representatives. 
CORE was an organization that awarded 
scholarships to graduating high school students in 
Philadelphia who had gained admission to a state 
university or the Community College of Philadelphia. 
CORE received funding from a variety of sources, 
including Sallie Mae. Because CORE also received 
federal funds, and because EAA had experience working 
with federal grants, EAA received and handled the federal 
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funds awarded to CORE. In short, EAA functioned as a 
fiduciary for CORE. When money became a problem for 
the FFM campaign, Fattah’s involvement with EAA and 
CORE soon became less about helping underprivileged 
students, and more about providing an avenue for 
disguising efforts to repay the illicit campaign funds from 
Lord. 
On January 7, 2008, Robert Brand contacted Fattah 
by telephone. Shortly thereafter, Lindenfeld received an 
unexpected call from Brand proposing an arrangement for 
Brand’s company, Solutions, to work with Strategies. 
Solutions had developed a software tool called “The 
Benefit Bank,” which was designed to “assist low and 
moderate income families to have enhanced access to 
benefits and taxes.” JA1993. During the telephone call, 
Brand referred to The Benefit Bank and suggested a 
contract under which Strategies would be paid $600,000 
upfront. JA1666. Shortly thereafter, on January 9, 2008, 
Brand followed up on his call to Lindenfeld with an email 
about “develop[ing] a working relationship where you 
could help us to grow The Benefit Bank and our process 
of civic engagement. While I know this is not your core 
business I would like to try to convince you to take us on 
as a client.” JA6427. Lindenfeld responded that he was 
interested. To Lindenfeld, “this was the way that 
Congressman Fattah was going to repay the debt to Al 
Lord.” JA1654. When Lindenfeld called Fattah and told 
him of the contact from Brand, Fattah simply replied that 
Lindenfeld “should just proceed.” JA1666–67. 
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A few days later, Brand emailed Nicholas at EAA a 
proposal from Solutions concerning The Benefit Bank, 
which sought EAA’s support in developing an education 
edition of The Benefit Bank and a $900,000 upfront 
payment. 
As the January 31 date for repayment of the balance 
of the $1 million Lord loan approached, a flurry of activity 
took place. On January 24, both Raymond Jones, chair of 
the EAA Board, and Nicholas signed a check from EAA 
made out to Solutions in the amount of $500,000. 
Although no contract existed between EAA and Solutions, 
the memo line of the check indicated that it was for a 
contract, and Nicholas entered it into EAA’s ledger.3 
That same day, Ivy Butts, an employee of 
Strategies, emailed Lindenfeld the instructions Brand 
would need to wire the $600,000 balance on the Lord loan. 
                                              
3 Raymond Jones, who was EAA’s Chairman of the Board 
from 2004 through 2007, recalled at trial that the Board 
had a limit on the amount that Nicholas could spend 
without board approval. JA1358, 1369. Nicholas was 
authorized to sign contracts on behalf of EAA for no more 
than $100,000. JA1369–71. Jones did not recall the 
contract between EAA and Solutions, nor did the EAA 
board minutes for December 2007, February 2008, or May 
2008 refer to the EAA–Solutions contract or to the 
substantial upfront payment of half a million dollars upon 
execution of the agreement. JA6358–63; 6567. 
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Within minutes, Lindenfeld forwarded that email to Brand 
at Solutions. Brand then made two telephone calls to 
Fattah. By late afternoon, Brand emailed Nicholas, 
informing her that he had “met with all the people I need 
to meet with and have a pretty clear schedule of what 
works best for us. I am also seeing what line of credit we 
have to stretch out the payments until you get your line of 
credit in place.” JA6558. Brand asked if they could talk 
and “finalize this effort.” JA6558. On January 25 and 26, 
there were a number of calls between Fattah, Brand, and 
Nicholas. 
On Sunday January 27, at 5:46 pm, Brand 
telephoned Fattah. At 10:59 pm, Brand emailed Nicholas 
a revised contract between EAA and Solutions for the 
engagement of services. Brand indicated he would send 
someone to pick up the check at about 1:00 pm the 
following day. The revised contract called for the same 
$900,000 payment from EAA to Solutions, yet specified 
that $500,000 was to be paid on signing, with $100,000 
due three weeks later, and another $100,000 to be paid six 
weeks out. No due date for the $200,000 balance was 
specified. The terms of the contract called for EAA to 
assist Solutions with further developing The Benefit Bank. 
In addition, under the contract, EAA would receive certain 
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funds from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania for a 
program relating to FAFSA applications.4 
The same evening, Brand sent Lindenfeld a contract 
entitled “Cooperative Development Agreement to Provide 
Services to Solutions for Progress, Inc. for Growth of The 
Benefit Bank.” JA6569. The agreement proposed a 
working partnership in which Strategies would work with 
Solutions to identify and secure a Benefit Bank affiliate in 
the District of Columbia and two other states, and to 
facilitate introductions to key officials in other states 
where The Benefit Bank might expand. The terms of the 
agreement provided that Solutions would pay $600,000 to 
Strategies by January 31, 2008, which would “enable 
[Strategies’] team to assess opportunities and develop 
detailed work plans for each area.” JA6572. Brand copied 
Solutions’ Chief Financial Officer, Michael Golden. 
Lindenfeld responded to Brand’s email within a minute, 
asking if Brand had received the wiring instructions. 
Brand immediately confirmed that he had. 
Concerned that Solutions did not have $600,000 to 
pay Strategies, Golden talked to Brand, who informed him 
that Solutions would be receiving a check for $500,000 
from EAA. Early the next morning, Nicholas responded to 
Brand’s email from the night before. She advised Brand 
that he could pick up the check, “but as I stated I am not 
                                              
4 FAFSA is an acronym for Free Application for Federal 
Student Aid. 
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in a position to sign a contract committing funds that I am 
not sure that I will have.” Gov’t Supp. App. (GSA) 1. That 
same day, a $540,000 transfer was made from the 
conference account, which EAA handled, into EAA’s 
checking account. The conference account was maintained 
to handle expenses for Fattah’s annual higher education 
conference. Prior to this transfer, EAA had only 
$23,170.95 in its account. EAA then tendered a $500,000 
check to Solutions, which promptly deposited the check 
before the close of that day’s business. EAA never 
replenished the $540,000 withdrawal from the conference 
account. 
Brand received the executed contract between 
Solutions and Strategies on January 28. Even though the 
contract called for Strategies to perform services in 
exchange for the $600,000 payment, Lindenfeld neither 
expected to do any work for the $600,000, nor did he in 
fact do any work. 
In sum, by January 28, Solutions had received 
$500,000 from EAA, but it still had to come up with 
$100,000 to provide Strategies with the entire amount 
needed to repay the Lord loan. Golden obtained the needed 
funds the following day by drawing $150,000 on a line of 
credit held by Brand’s wife. Brand and Fattah spoke four 
more times on the telephone on January 29. Trial evidence 
later showed that, during the month of January 2008, 
neither the FFM campaign bank account nor Fattah’s 
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personal account had a sufficient balance to fund a 
$600,000 payment. 
On the morning of January 30, frustrated by the 
delay, Lindenfeld sent Brand an email with a subject line 
“You are killing me.” JA6430. Lindenfeld stated that he 
had “made a commitment based on yours to me. Please 
don’t drag this out. I have a lot on the line.” Id. Brand 
responded late in the afternoon, stating: “just met with 
Michael. He does the transfer at 8 AM tomorrow. It should 
be in your account ($600K) early tomorrow morning.” Id. 
Lindenfeld replied: “The earlier the better.” Id. The 
following morning, Golden wired $600,000 from 
Solutions’ Pennsylvania bank account into Strategies’ 
Washington D.C. bank account. JA2745, 2874. Strategies 
in turn, wired the same amount from its Washington D.C. 
bank account to Lord’s bank account in Virginia. JA2874, 
6549. Around noon, Brand telephoned Lindenfeld. 
In the days following the exhaustive efforts to meet 
the January 31 loan repayment deadline, four more 
telephone calls took place between Brand and Fattah.5 
Naylor learned at some point that the loan had been paid 
off. When Naylor asked Fattah about details of the 
repayment, Fattah simply replied “[t]hat it went through 
EAA to Solutions and it was done.” JA3088. 
                                              
5 By contrast, between October to December 2007, Brand 
and Fattah spoke by telephone only “once or twice [a] 
month.” JA2734. 
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Meanwhile, at some point in January, EAA received 
notice that the Department of Justice Office of the 
Inspector General (DOJ) intended to audit its books.6 DOJ 
auditors told EAA to provide, at the “entrance 
conference,” documentation containing budgetary and 
accounting information. EAA failed to produce any 
accounting information. 
Although Lindenfeld was no longer making 
demands of Brand, Brand was still owed the remaining 
$100,000 that Solutions had paid to satisfy the Lord loan. 
On March 23, 2008, Brand sent Nicholas an email 
outlining his efforts to contact her over the previous two 
weeks about documentation on the CORE work, how to 
proceed with the paperwork for the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania, and “how we can get our proposed contract 
signed and the outstanding payments made.” JA2749. 
Nicholas responded that evening, writing: 
I can appreciate your urgency however I do 
have EAA work that I continue to do, 
including the [usual] facilitation of programs, 
our financial audit, the start-up of two new 
programs[,] and of course the DOJ audit. I am 
still trying to obtain a line of credit without a 
completed 2007 audit and things are getting a 
                                              
6 One of the terms and conditions of a federal grant is that 
the recipient “be readily prepared for an audit.” JA2314. 
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little uncomfortable now as I try to keep us 
afloat. 
JA6576. Nicholas told Brand that the DOJ auditors were 
making demands and would soon be on site. She noted that 
“[t]hey are still very uncomfortable with your contract 
amongst other things and depending on their findings 
some of the funding received may have to be returned.” Id. 
Nicholas said that she had submitted the paperwork to the 
state, and she told Brand that “in the future . . . as a result 
of the DOJ audit I will not be in a position to do another 
contract such as this.” Id. 
Shortly after Nicholas’s reply to Brand, Nicholas 
forwarded the Brand–Nicholas email chain to Fattah. The 
body of the email stated, in its entirety: “I really don’t 
appreciate the tone of Bob’s email. I can appreciate that he 
has some things going on however I am doing my best to 
assist him. Some other things are a priority. He needs to 
back off.” GSA2. Later that night, Bowser sent Fattah an 
email with a subject line that read “Karen N” and a 
telephone number. JA2752. 
As the audit continued, the auditors found other 
deficiencies. During April of 2008, DOJ issued a notice of 
irregularity to EAA, which resulted in the audit being 
referred to DOJ’s Investigations Division for a more 
comprehensive review. 
On April 24, 2008, Brand emailed Nicholas asking 
for a time to update her on The Benefit Bank. In early May, 
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Brand sent another email to Nicholas attaching a revised 
EAA–Solutions contract proposal, which decreased the 
initial upfront cost from $900,000 to $700,000. 
Although Solutions and EAA had still not signed a 
contract, EAA paid Solutions another $100,000 in May. 
That money was obtained via a loan to EAA from CORE. 
Thomas Butler, who had worked for Fattah both when 
Fattah was in Congress and when he was in the General 
Assembly, was CORE’s executive director. Butler had 
been contacted in mid-May by Jackie Barnett, a member 
of CORE’s Board who had also worked with 
Congressman Fattah. Barnett informed Butler that 
Nicholas had requested a loan from CORE to EAA, and 
that Fattah, as Chairman of CORE’s Board, had approved 
it. Butler and Barnett withdrew funds from two CORE 
bank accounts and obtained a cashier’s check, dated May 
19, in the amount of $225,000 and made payable to EAA. 
The withdrawals were from accounts used for Sallie Mae 
funds and other scholarship money. 
After EAA received the $225,000 check, EAA 
tendered a $100,000 check to Solutions. The check bore 
the notation “Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.” EAA 
repaid CORE the following month. Because EAA lacked 
sufficient funds of its own to cover this payment, EAA 
drew on grant money that it had received from NASA. 
Brand and Lindenfeld continued to communicate 
concerning The Benefit Bank. In July of 2008, a meeting 
was held at Solutions with Brand, Lindenfeld, Golden, and 
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other Solutions employees to discuss “an enormous 
amount of work” that Brand wanted Strategies to do. 
JA1670. Lindenfeld said in response “we’d be glad to do 
that, but . . . we would have to be paid.” Id. At that point, 
someone in the meeting stated that Strategies “had already 
been paid” $600,000. Id. Lindenfeld replied: “well, that 
was for Congressman Fattah, . . . that’s not for us. So if 
you want us to do work, we have to get paid for it 
separately.” Id. Brand became upset with Lindenfeld over 
his comment about being paid because his colleagues at 
Solutions were not aware of the reason for the $600,000 
payment. 
Meanwhile, EAA was attempting to meet the 
demands of the DOJ auditors, who were focused on the 
relationship between EAA and CORE. DOJ served a 
subpoena upon Solutions to produce “[a]ny and all 
documents including, but not limited to, contract 
documents, invoices, correspondence, timesheets, 
deliverables and proof of payment related to any services 
provided to or payments received” from CORE or EAA. 
JA2350. 
Special Agent Dieffenbach, from the DOJ, 
interviewed Nicholas on July 14, 2008. During that 
interview, Nicholas discussed the relationship between 
EAA and CORE, how invoices were paid, and how 
consultants were handled. Nicholas also answered 
questions about EAA’s relationship with Solutions, 
including the payment of invoices. She did not inform 
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Agent Dieffenbach of the $500,000 payment in January or 
the subsequent $100,000 payment in May. Nor did the 
interview address the EAA–Solutions contract that 
purportedly required those payments, because the contract 
had yet to be produced. 
Solutions failed to comply with the subpoena, 
prompting an email from Agent Dieffenbach on August 26 
asking for an update concerning Solutions’ reply to the 
DOJ subpoena. Solutions then produced an undated 
version of the EAA–Solutions contract that required the 
$600,000 upfront payment. Neither Brand nor Nicholas 
provided the auditors with the January and May checks 
from EAA to Solutions. 
Efforts to conceal the repayment of the Lord loan 
and to promote the political and financial interests of 
Fattah continued. The FFM campaign reports indicated in-
kind contributions of debt forgiveness by SLA even 
though there had been no actual debt. In September of 
2009, with EAA’s ledgers still under scrutiny, Nicholas 
altered the description of the entry for the $100,000 check 
to Solutions from “professional fees consulting” to 
“CORE Philly.” JA2546. Other FFM campaign debt was 
reduced further after Vederman negotiated with creditors. 
EAA never fully recovered from its payment of the 
$600,000 balance on the Lord loan and the audits that took 
place in 2008. It began laying off employees in 2011, and 
by June of 2012, only four employees remained. JA3659. 
EAA ceased operations at some point in 2012. JA1530. 
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2. The College Tuition Component of the FFM 
Scheme 
Although the FFM campaign was close to insolvent, 
it nevertheless made tuition payments for Fattah’s son, 
Chaka Fattah Jr., also known as Chip. Chip attended 
Drexel University, but had yet to complete his coursework 
because he had failed to pay an outstanding tuition 
balance. As the FFM campaign got underway in 2007, 
Fattah wanted Chip to re-enroll in classes at Drexel and 
get a degree. Fattah asked Naylor to help financially, and 
he did so by writing checks from SLA to Drexel toward 
Chip’s outstanding tuition. By October of 2007, Chip was 
permitted to re-enroll in classes. 
Although Naylor never directly addressed the issue 
with Fattah, he agreed to assist with Chip’s outstanding 
tuition with the expectation that SLA would be repaid. The 
first check to Drexel in the amount of $5,000 was sent in 
August of 2007, with $400 payments in the months that 
followed until August of 2008. At some point, Chip 
informed Naylor that the payee was no longer Drexel, but 
Sallie Mae. Naylor then began sending monthly checks 
from SLA to Sallie Mae. Those payments, in the amount 
of $525.52, began in March of 2009 and continued until 
April of 2011, after which Fattah told Naylor he no longer 
needed to make them. SLA’s payments to Drexel and 
Sallie Mae totaled $23,063.52. 
Naylor’s expectation of repayment was eventually 
realized. Beginning in January of 2008 and continuing 
28 
until November 2010, Bowser sporadically sent SLA 
reimbursement checks from the FFM campaign with a 
notation that payment was for “election day operation 
expenses.” JA3136. The FFM funds had been transferred 
from the Fattah for Congress campaign. These 
reimbursement checks totaled $25,400. In an effort to 
conceal the source of the payments to Drexel and Sallie 
Mae, and to make it appear that the younger Fattah had 
performed services for SLA, Naylor created false tax 
forms for Chip. Chip, however, had never performed 
services for SLA. 
3. The NOAA Grant and the Phantom Conference 
In mid-December 2011, when EAA was 
experiencing serious financial difficulties, Nicholas 
submitted an email request to the educational partnership 
program of the National Oceanic & Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) for a grant “designed to provide 
training opportunities and funding to students at minority 
serving institutions” interested in science, technology, 
engineering, and math fields related to NOAA’s mission. 
JA3354–55. The request sought $409,000 to fund EAA’s 
annual conference scheduled for February 17–19, 2012. 
Jacqueline Rousseau, a supervisory program manager at 
NOAA, participated in a conference call with Nicholas 
shortly thereafter and advised Nicholas that the agency 
could not afford the $409,000 request but would consider 
a smaller grant. Rousseau advised Nicholas that EAA 
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would need to submit an application if it wished to be 
considered for a grant. 
Before submitting a grant application, Nicholas 
emailed Rousseau about sponsoring the conference. On 
January 11, 2012, Rousseau informed Nicholas that the 
“NOAA Office of Education, Scholarship Programs has 
agreed to participate and provide sponsorship funds of 
$50K to support the referenced conference.” JA6453. 
Rousseau also informed Nicholas that Chantell Haskins, 
who also worked with the student scholarship program, 
would be the point of contact for NOAA. 
In February 2012, EAA held its annual conference 
at the Sheraton Hotel in downtown Philadelphia. The 
conference had been held at the same location each year 
since 2008. 
Nicholas contacted Haskins at some point in early 
2012, inquiring about the $50,000 grant. On May 8, 2012, 
Haskins sent Nicholas an e-mail which included 
information about submitting proposals to fund a 
conference for students. EAA then submitted a grant 
application, which Haskins reviewed. She advised 
Nicholas on June 28, 2012 that the grant could not be used 
to provide meals, and that the date of the conference would 
have to be pushed back, with the new date included in a 
modified application. When Nicholas asked if expenses 
from a previous conference could be paid from the new 
grant, Haskins informed her that this was not allowed. 
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In early July 2012, Nicholas sent a modified grant 
proposal to Haskins. It eliminated the budget item for food 
and changed the date of the 2012 conference to October 
19–21, 2012 at the same Sheraton Hotel in Philadelphia 
where EAA’s annual conference had taken place earlier in 
the year. NOAA approved a $50,000 grant for the October 
2012 conference—a conference that would never be held. 
Unaware that no October 2012 conference had 
taken place, NOAA allowed Nicholas access to the 
$50,000 grant in March of 2013. She then transferred the 
entire amount from NOAA to EAA’s bank account a few 
days later. Naylor had performed services for EAA for 
which he was still owed $116,590. JA3119. In discussions 
with Naylor, Nicholas had informed him that the 
likelihood of EAA’s being able to pay him was “[n]ot very 
good.” JA3120. Yet several days after EAA had received 
the $50,000 from NOAA, Nicholas sent Naylor a check 
for $20,000. JA3120, 4283. 
On April 3, 2013, Nicholas submitted a final report 
to NOAA concerning EAA’s use of the grant. Notably, 
page 4 of the report stated the conference had been held in 
February 2012, while page 17 stated that the conference 
had been held from October 19 to 21, 2012. NOAA issued 
a notice asking for clarification and for a list of students 
who had been supported at the conference. Nicholas failed 
to file either a clarifying report regarding the date of the 
conference or a timely report regarding the disbursement 
of the grant. Finally, in November of 2013, Nicholas 
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submitted the final Federal Financial Report in which she 
certified, falsely, that the $50,000 had been used for a 
project during the period from August 1, 2012 to 
December 30, 2012. 
B. The Blue Guardians Scheme 
In addition to functioning as the conduit for Lord’s 
$1 million loan to Fattah’s campaign, Lindenfeld’s 
company, Strategies, also performed services for the 
campaign. The work resulted in indebtedness from FFM 
to Strategies of approximately $95,000. Fattah made 
several small payments, but failed to pay the full amount 
due. Although Lindenfeld spoke to Fattah, Naylor and 
Bowser about the debt, no payments were forthcoming. 
During a meeting in Fattah’s D.C. office, Fattah told 
Lindenfeld “that [repayment] really wasn’t going to be 
possible because the campaign had been over for a long 
time” and the funds were not available. JA1693. Fattah 
then asked Lindenfeld if he could write off the debt on his 
FFM campaign finance reports. Id. Lindenfeld told Fattah 
that as long as he was paid, it was not his business how 
Fattah disclosed it on the campaign finance reports. 
JA1694. 
In lieu of repayment, Fattah suggested that 
Strategies could claim to be interested in setting up an 
entity to address environmental issues and ocean pollution 
along the coastline and in the Caribbean. Fattah explained 
that creating such an entity would make it possible to 
obtain an appropriation from the government. Hearing 
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this, Lindenfeld knew he was not going to be paid by the 
FFM campaign, and was amenable to receiving money 
from an appropriation instead. At a later meeting, 
Lindenfeld told Fattah that the name of the entity would 
be “Blue Guardians.” Lindenfeld consulted with an 
attorney about creating Blue Guardians as an entity to 
receive the federal grant. He emailed Fattah, asking 
questions about how to complete an application to the 
House Appropriations Committee. Fattah provided 
suggestions, and an application was eventually completed. 
It indicated that Blue Guardians would be “in operation for 
a minimum of ten years,” and, in accordance with Fattah’s 
guidance, requested $15 million in federal funds. JA1711–
13. 
Lindenfeld submitted the application to Fattah’s 
office in April of 2009. Afterward, a Fattah staffer 
contacted Lindenfeld to suggest that he change his 
Washington, D.C., address to Philadelphia because that 
was the location of Fattah’s district. Fattah later suggested 
to Lindenfeld that Brand might allow the use of his 
Philadelphia office address, a plan to which Brand agreed. 
In February 2010, Lindenfeld submitted a second 
application to the Appropriations Committee. In March, 
Fattah submitted a project request using his congressional 
letterhead and seeking $3,000,000 for the “Blue 
Guardians, Coastal Environmental Education Outreach 
Program.” JA6432. Within a month, Blue Guardians had 
both articles of incorporation and a bank account. Around 
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that time, a news reporter contacted Lindenfeld to discuss 
the new Blue Guardians entity. The inquiry made 
Lindenfeld uncomfortable, and he ultimately decided to 
abandon the Blue Guardians project. He continued to seek 
payment from Fattah, to no avail. 
Nonetheless, having obtained Lindenfeld’s 
acquiescence to writing off the campaign’s debt to 
Strategies, Fattah started falsifying FFM’s campaign 
reports. Beginning in 2009 and extending through 2013, 
the FFM campaign reports executed by Fattah and Bowser 
stated that Strategies made in-kind contributions of 
$20,000, until the debt appeared to have been paid in full. 
C. The Fattah–Vederman Bribery Scheme 
Vederman and Fattah were personal friends. 
Vederman was a successful businessman who had also 
served in prominent roles in the administrations of Ed 
Rendell when he was Mayor of Philadelphia and Governor 
of Pennsylvania. In November of 2008, Vederman was a 
senior consultant in the government and public affairs 
practice group of a Philadelphia law firm. His assistance 
to the FFM campaign included paying for rented vans used 
in the get-out-the-vote effort. 
After Fattah’s electoral defeat, the campaign still 
owed more than $84,000 to a different law firm for 
services performed for the campaign. Vederman 
approached that firm in the summer of 2008 asking if it 
would forgive FFM’s debt. Negotiations resulted in a 
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commitment from FFM to pay the firm $30,000 by the end 
of 2008 in exchange for forgiveness of $20,000, all of 
which would appear on the FFM campaign finance report. 
Vederman’s efforts also led to payment by Fattah of an 
additional $10,000 in 2009 to the law firm, in exchange 
for additional forgiveness of $20,000 of debt. It was not 
long after Vederman’s successful efforts to lower Fattah’s 
campaign debt, that Fattah wrote a letter to U.S. Senator 
Robert P. Casey recommending Vederman for an 
ambassadorship. 
At some point in 2010, Vederman again intervened 
on behalf of the FFM campaign. FFM remained in debt to 
an advertising and public relations firm owned by Robert 
Dilella. By late 2011, Vederman and Dilella had worked 
out a settlement to resolve the outstanding debt. Pursuant 
to that settlement, Dilella received partial payment from 
the FFM campaign: $25,000 in satisfaction of a $55,000 
debt. Dilella testified at trial that he would not have agreed 
to retire a portion of the debt had he known the FFM 
campaign was paying college tuition for Fattah’s son. 
Vederman helped Fattah financially in other ways. 
Before the 2006 FFM campaign, Fattah and his wife, 
Renee Chenault-Fattah, sponsored a young woman named 
Simone Muller to live with them as an au pair exchange 
visitor. Muller was from South Africa, and her J-1 visa 
allowed her to serve as a nanny and to study in the United 
States. Muller later applied for and received a second visa, 
an F-1 student visa that indicated she had been accepted as 
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an international student at the Community College of 
Philadelphia. The application indicated that Muller would 
again be residing with the Fattahs. Notwithstanding this 
living arrangement, Fattah identified Vederman as the 
person who would be paying for Muller’s trip to the 
United States. 
By the beginning of 2010, Muller wished to transfer 
to Philadelphia University. This required her to submit 
verification that funds were available to pay for her study. 
Although the Fattahs were Muller’s sponsors, Fattah 
explained to the University’s Dean of Enrollment Services 
that he was submitting a letter of secondary support from 
Vederman. JA3754, 3763–65, 6504. Without Vederman’s 
January 2010 letter of support, the University would not 
have admitted Muller. In addition to this pledge of support, 
Vederman paid $3,000 of Muller’s tuition. Shortly 
thereafter, Fattah resumed his efforts to secure an 
ambassadorship for Vederman. 
In February of 2010, Fattah staffer Maisha Leek 
contacted Katherine Kochman, a scheduler for White 
House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel. Leek requested a 
telephone conference with Emanuel, Rendell, and Fattah 
to discuss Vederman’s “serving his country in an 
international capacity.” JA2893. In a follow-up email on 
March 26, Leek sent documents to Kristin Sheehy, a 
secretary to White House Deputy Chief of Staff James 
Messina. The documents included Fattah’s 2008 letter to 
Senator Casey and Vederman’s biography. After 
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participating in a telephone conference about Vederman 
with Fattah and Rendell, Messina sent Vederman’s 
biography to the White House personnel office for 
consideration. 
As the April 2010 tax deadline approached, Fattah 
still owed the City of Philadelphia earned income tax in 
the amount of $2,381. Just days before the filing deadline, 
Vederman gave a check to Chip Fattah for $3,500. The 
younger Fattah quickly deposited $2,310 into his father’s 
bank account. Fattah paid his tax bill on April 15. Without 
Chip’s deposit into his father’s bank account, the older 
Fattah would not have had sufficient funds to pay his tax 
bill. 
On October 30, 2010, Vederman gave Chip another 
check, this one for $2,800. That same day, Fattah hand-
delivered a letter to President Obama recommending 
Vederman for an ambassadorship. A few weeks later, 
Fattah’s staffer, Leek, sent the letter that Fattah had given 
to President Obama to Messina’s office. That letter 
pointed out that both Rendell and Fattah had sent letters 
on behalf of Vederman, and that he was an 
“unquestionably exceptional candidate for an 
ambassadorship.” JA6291–92. 
Fattah’s efforts to secure Vederman an 
ambassadorship were unsuccessful. Fattah then shifted 
gears and sought to secure Vederman a position on a 
federal trade committee. Fattah approached Ron Kirk, who 
served as U.S. Trade Representative, and asked him to 
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speak with a constituent. In May of 2011, Leek followed 
up on that discussion by emailing Kirk and asking him to 
meet with Vederman. Kirk met with Vederman on June 5, 
2011 and explained to him the role of the trade advisory 
committees. Although the two men “had a very nice 
conversation,” JA 3566, it soon became “pretty apparent 
to [Kirk and his staff] that [serving on a trade advisory 
committee was] not what Mr. Vederman was interested 
in.” JA3567. As Kirk put it, “it was obvious that 
[Vederman] was looking for something perhaps more 
robust in his mind or . . . higher profile than one of our 
advisory committees.” Id. Given Vederman’s lukewarm 
interest, no appointment to an advisory committee was 
forthcoming. 
In late December 2011, the Fattahs applied for a 
mortgage so they could purchase a second home in the 
Poconos. Shortly after applying for the mortgage, Fattah 
emailed Vederman, offering to sell him his wife’s 1989 
Porsche for $18,000. Vederman accepted the offer. The 
next day, Vederman wired $18,000 to Fattah’s Wright 
Patman Federal Credit Union account. 
The Credit Union Mortgage Association (CUMA) 
acted as the loan processing organization for the home 
mortgage. Because CUMA is required to verify the source 
of any large deposits, CUMA’s mortgage loan processor, 
Victoria Souza, contacted Fattah on January 17, 2012, to 
confirm the source of the $18,000. Fattah informed Souza 
that the $18,000 represented the proceeds of the Porsche 
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sale. Souza requested documentation, including a signed 
bill of sale and title. 
That same day, Bowser emailed Vederman a blank 
bill of sale for the Porsche. After Vederman signed the bill 
of sale, Fattah forwarded it to Souza. The bill of sale was 
dated January 16, 2012, which was the day before Souza 
had requested the documentation. It bore the signatures of 
Renee Chenault-Fattah and Herbert Vederman, with 
Bonnie Bowser as a witness. 
Fattah also provided Souza with a copy of the 
Porsche’s title. It was dated the same day it was sent to 
Souza, and bore signatures of Chenault-Fattah as the seller 
and Vederman as buyer, along with a notary’s stamp. 
Neither Vederman nor Chenault-Fattah actually appeared 
before the notary. 
Vederman never took possession of the Porsche. 
Renee Chenault-Fattah continued to have the Porsche 
serviced and insured long after the purported sale had 
taken place. Moreover, the Porsche remained registered in 
Chenault-Fattah’s name, and was never registered to 
Herbert Vederman. When FBI agents searched the 
Fattahs’ home in 2014, the Porsche was discovered in the 
Fattahs’ garage. 
On January 24, 2012, the Fattahs wired $25,000 to 
the attorney handling the escrow account for the purchase 
of the vacation home. Without the $18,000 transfer from 
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Vederman, the Fattahs would not have had sufficient funds 
in their bank accounts to close on the home. 
Around the same time that the Fattahs were 
purchasing the house in the Poconos, Fattah’s Philadelphia 
office hired Vederman’s longtime girlfriend, Alexandra 
Zionts. Zionts had long worked for a federal magistrate 
judge in Florida. Near the end of 2011, the magistrate 
judge retired, leaving Zionts ten months shy of obtaining 
the necessary service required to receive retirement 
benefits. If Zionts could find another job in the federal 
government, her benefits and pension would not be 
adversely affected. Vederman assisted Zionts in her job 
search, which included calling Fattah. Fattah hired her, a 
move that put his congressional office overbudget. Zionts 
worked in Fattah’s office for only about two months, 
leaving to work for a congressman from Florida. 
Tia Watson, who performed constituent services for 
Fattah and worked on the same floor as Zionts in Fattah’s 
district office, testified she had no idea what work Zionts 
performed. Although Zionts contacted Temple University 
about archiving Fattah’s papers from his career in both the 
state and federal government, an employee from Temple 
University observed that Zionts’ work contributed nothing 
of value to the papers project. 
D. The Indictment and Trial 
Fattah’s schemes eventually unraveled. On July 29, 
2015, a federal grand jury in the Eastern District of 
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Pennsylvania returned a twenty-nine count indictment 
alleging that Fattah and his associates had engaged in a 
variety of criminal acts. Fattah, Vederman, Nicholas, 
Brand, and Bowser were charged with unlawfully 
conspiring to violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). In 
addition to the RICO charge, the indictment alleged that 
Fattah and certain co-defendants had unlawfully conspired 
to commit wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1349; honest 
services fraud, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1346, 1349; mail fraud, 
18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1349; money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1956; and to defraud the United States, 18 U.S.C. § 371. 
Several defendants were also charged with making false 
statements to banks, 18 U.S.C. § 1014; falsifying records, 
18 U.S.C. § 1519; laundering money, 18 U.S.C. § 1957; 
and engaging in mail, wire, and bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 1341, 1343, and 1344. 
The RICO charge alleged that the defendants and 
other co-conspirators constituted an enterprise aimed at 
supporting and promoting Fattah’s political and financial 
interests. The efforts to conceal the $1 million Lord loan 
and its repayment are at the heart of the RICO conspiracy 
and the Fattah for Mayor scheme. The indictment further 
alleged that the RICO enterprise involved: (1) the scheme 
to satisfy an outstanding campaign debt by creating the 
fake “Blue Guardians” nonprofit; and (2) the bribery 
scheme to obtain payments and things of value from 
Vederman in exchange for Fattah’s efforts to secure 
Vederman an appointment as a United States Ambassador. 
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A jury trial, before the Honorable Harvey Bartle III 
of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, began on May 16, 
2016, and lasted about a month.7 Judge Bartle charged the 
jury on Wednesday, June 15, 2016, and deliberations 
began late that afternoon. The following day, after 
deliberating for only four hours, the jury sent a note to the 
judge. Written by the foreperson, the note read: 
Juror Number 12 refuses to vote by the letter 
of the law. He will not, after proof, still 
change his vote. His answer will not change. 
He has the 11 of us a total wreck knowing that 
we are not getting anywhere in the hour of 
deliberation yesterday and the three hours 
today. We have zero verdicts at this time all 
due to Juror Number 12. He will not listen or 
reason with anybody. He is killing every 
other juror’s experience. We showed him all 
the proof. He doesn’t care. Juror Number 12 
has an agenda or ax to grind w/govt. 
JA5916. 
Shortly after receiving the foreperson’s note, the 
Court received a second communication—a note signed 
                                              
7 The District Court dismissed one charge prior to 
trial: an individual money laundering count against 
Nicholas. 
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by nine jurors, including the foreperson. The second note 
read: 
We feel that [Juror 12] is argumentative, 
incapable of making decision. He constantly 
scream [sic] at all of us. 
Id. 
Judge Bartle met with counsel in his chambers and 
advised them of his intention to voir dire both the 
foreperson and Juror 12 in an effort to determine whether 
the juror was deliberating as required by his oath. The 
Judge also indicated that he would “stay away from the 
merits of the case,” and that whether he would voir dire 
more jurors “remain[ed] to be seen.” JA5917. 
Counsel for the defendants objected to the Court’s 
proposed inquiry. As a group, they indicated that while the 
note could be read as suggesting “a flat refusal to 
deliberate,” they were of the opinion that it sounded “more 
in the manner of a disagreement over the evidence.” 
JA5918. Nicholas’s counsel specifically argued that 
questioning the jurors so quickly after the start of 
deliberations would send a message that differences of 
opinion among a block of jurors could be resolved by 
complaining to the Court. Defense counsel acknowledged 
that the case law gave Judge Bartle wide discretion on how 
to proceed, but suggested that a “less intrusive” course of 
action was preferred. JA5918–19. They collectively urged 
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the Court to do nothing more than remind the jurors of 
their duty to deliberate. 
The Government agreed with Judge Bartle’s 
proposed voir dire. In the prosecution’s view, the Court 
had already given proper instructions to the jury on their 
duty to deliberate. The Government further argued that if 
Juror 12 had exhibited bias, as suggested in the notes, he 
would have lied during the voir dire process and his 
refusal to deliberate would be “further evidence of that and 
his unsuitability as a juror.” JA5921. 
With all counsel present, and over defense counsel’s 
objections, Judge Bartle ultimately questioned five jurors 
in chambers. He questioned Juror 2 (the foreperson), Juror 
12 (the subject of the complaints), Juror 3, Juror 6, and 
Juror 1. 
Judge Bartle began each voir dire by informing the 
juror that he would ask a series of questions, but would not 
inquire into the merits of the case or how any juror was 
voting. Each juror was placed under oath, and Judge Bartle 
asked, among other questions, whether screaming was 
occurring; whether the jurors were discussing the 
evidence; whether Juror 12 was placing his hands on other 
jurors; and whether Juror 12 was unwilling to follow his 
instructions. 
The foreperson acknowledged that he had written 
the initial note during lunch earlier that day. He stated that 
Juror 12 was not willing to follow the law, but instead 
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“want[ed] to add his own piece of the law . . . which has 
nothing to do with it.” JA5927–28. The foreperson further 
testified that Juror 12 “was standing up screaming” and 
that “[i]t was everybody pretty much against [Juror 12].” 
JA5929. He testified that Juror 12 “has his own agenda,” 
and that Juror 12 put his hand on another juror. JA5930. 
The foreperson also stated that the jury had discussed only 
a single count since the day before, and that they were still 
discussing it. When the District Court responded that the 
jurors should understand that they could take as much time 
as they needed, the foreperson responded: “I understand 
that. . . . [W]e all understand it. But we feel that he’s just—
he’s got another agenda.” JA5934. 
Judge Bartle advised counsel that he considered this 
“a very serious situation” and that he would proceed to 
voir dire Juror 12. JA5937. Fattah’s counsel renewed his 
objection to questioning Juror 12, which the Court 
overruled. Brand’s counsel argued that because the Court 
had decided to voir dire Juror 12, it should also voir dire 
an additional juror. The Court agreed to do so. 
When the Court questioned Juror 12, he admitted to 
having “yelled back” at others, but only when they raised 
their voices to him. JA5939. Juror 12 contended that he, in 
fact, was “the only one” deliberating. Id. When an initial 
vote was taken the previous afternoon, his vote “was 
different than everybody else’s.” Id. Juror 12 explained to 
the other jurors why his vote was different, bringing up 
specific evidence. In response, the other jurors said “that 
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doesn’t mean anything” and “pointed to the indictment.” 
JA5940. Juror 12 told the other jurors that the indictment 
is not evidence. Id. In response, the others “threatened to 
have [him] thrown off.” Id. 
Juror 12 testified that a similar sequence of events 
had taken place that morning. After a brief period of 
deliberations, another vote was taken, and with the same 
result as the previous afternoon. A discussion ensued, and 
the other jurors again “point[ed] to the indictment.” Id. 
Juror 12 told them to “read the charge,” “[t]he indictment 
is not evidence.” Id. They read the charge, and Juror 12 
again attempted to explain his view, but the other jurors 
paid little attention. Accordingly, Juror 12 told the others 
that if they did not want him there, he “[didn’t] want to be 
[there]”—he would be “[o]kay with it” if they wanted him 
taken off the jury. JA5941. 
Upon hearing this testimony, Judge Bartle again 
asked about the tone of deliberations. Juror 12 repeated 
that he raised his voice only in response to others who did 
so—he did “not want to yell at anybody.” JA5942. Judge 
Bartle then asked whether he had touched other jurors. 
Juror 12 replied that he had not hurt anyone. When asked 
if he had put his hand on anybody’s shoulder, Juror 12 
answered: “I couldn’t remember to be honest with you.” 
JA5946. 
Following Juror 12’s voir dire, the Court summoned 
Juror 3 to chambers. Juror 3 testified that, after discussion 
of a particular count, there was one juror at odds with the 
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others. According to Juror 3, “the rest of the jurors 
pounced on the gentleman with the . . . dissenting 
opinion.” JA5948. Juror 3 testified that Juror 12 “got very 
defensive and just a little bit [] impatient” and that “the 
other jurors were very impatient with him.” Id. Juror 3 did 
not recall witnessing Juror 12 putting his hand on any 
other jurors. 
The Government requested that the Court voir dire 
another juror. Defense counsel objected, claiming that the 
questioning “threaten[ed] . . . the entire deliberative 
process.” JA5949–50. Judge Bartle reminded counsel that 
he had the authority to question each juror, and called for 
voir dire of Juror 6. 
Juror 6 testified that the jury had been discussing the 
case and reviewing the evidence, but that Juror 12 “wants 
to be seen” and was “being obstinate.” JA5951–52. 
According to Juror 6, Juror 12 “may not agree” with the 
conclusion of other jurors but “doesn’t give valid reasons 
as to why he may disagree with the charge.” JA5952. Juror 
6 also revealed that Juror 12 was the first to raise his voice, 
and that he may have touched her and another juror. When 
asked to clarify what she meant by Juror 12 disagreeing 
with “the charge,” Juror 6 testified that Juror 12 was 
“reading maybe too deeply into it and putting his own 
emotions into it instead of just looking at what it says [and] 
what the facts are.” JA5952, 5955. According to Juror 6, 
Juror 12 “just continues to read past that into his own mind 
of what he feels it should be.” JA5955. Juror 6 testified 
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that Juror 12’s “justification for some of his responses [did 
not] seem to relate to what the matter [was] before 
[them].” JA5957. 
Judge Bartle chose to hear from yet another juror. 
Juror 1 was called and informed the Court and counsel that 
the jury “really [hadn’t] been able to even start the 
deliberation process” in light of the disruptive behavior of 
“one particular individual.” JA5958–59. The particular 
individual, according to Juror 1, was “very opinionated” 
and “[came] into the process with his view already 
established, refusing to even listen to any of the evidence 
. . . [being] very forceful . . . standing up, yelling, pointing 
his finger.” JA5959. When asked if this individual was 
willing to follow the Court’s instructions, Juror 1 testified 
that he “pours [sic] over the documents very well” but that 
he was adding other factors to answer the question on the 
verdict form, such as “what did this person feel.” JA5961. 
When Judge Bartle advised that intent was an appropriate 
consideration, Juror 1 agreed but said that Juror 12 was 
“trying to investigate . . . going way beyond the scope” of 
the evidence before them. JA5961–62. Juror 12, he said, 
“has an opinion and that opinion is established.” JA5962. 
He stated that Juror 12 was “not willing to listen to any 
sort of reason or any sort of what everyone else is saying” 
but instead, was “trying to force everyone else to get to his 
point of view.” Id. “[I]f he feels like he’s not getting there, 
he gets louder and louder and points and puts his hand on 
your shoulder . . . .” Id. 
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After questioning the five jurors (Jurors 1, 2, 3, 6, 
and 12), Judge Bartle heard argument from counsel. The 
attorney for the Government pointed out that the Court 
would have to make a credibility determination because 
Juror 12 stated that he did not recall touching anyone. In 
the Government’s view, Juror 12 was disrupting the 
process and should be removed. Defense counsel 
disagreed. They argued that Juror 12 was conscientious 
and was engaging with the evidence. They pointed out that 
despite the testimony that Juror 12 was reading too deeply 
into the instructions or introducing new factors for the jury 
to consider, Juror 6 had testified that the jurors “talked it 
through” and resolved the concern. JA5965. Defense 
counsel argued that the jury was discussing intent, an issue 
that was at the heart of the case. Defense counsel perceived 
no breakdown in deliberations and argued that dismissal 
would be premature. They suggested, instead, that the 
Court provide a supplemental instruction. 
Judge Bartle decided to adjourn for the afternoon. 
But before he left the courtroom, defense counsel brought 
two matters to his attention. First, in light of testimony 
during the voir dire, they asked that the jury be 
reinstructed that the verdict form and indictment were not 
evidence. Second, they apprised the Judge of the standard 
for juror dismissal set forth in United States v. Kemp, 500 
F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 2007). Defense counsel stated that under 
Kemp, a request to discharge a juror must be denied if there 
is a possibility that the request stems from the juror’s view 
of the evidence. Judge Bartle expressed hesitation on 
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reinstructing the jury, but agreed that Kemp would control 
his determination as to whether dismissal was appropriate. 
With the following morning came a new revelation. 
With counsel in chambers, the Judge informed them that 
“additional significant evidence” had come to light since 
the previous day’s recess. JA5980. He placed his 
courtroom deputy under oath, and she proceeded to testify 
to an exchange that had occurred the previous day as she 
was escorting Juror 12 back to the jury room after he had 
been voir dired. According to the deputy, Juror 12 stopped 
her in the hallway, placed his hand on her shoulder, and 
looked her “straight in the eye.” JA5981. He then said: 
“I’m going to hang this jury.” Id. The deputy then related 
that before any further conversation could take place 
between Juror 12 and the deputy, Judge Bartle summoned 
Juror 12 back to his chambers. Later that day, however, 
Juror 12 and the courtroom deputy had another exchange. 
She testified that after all five jurors had been questioned, 
Juror 12 emerged from the jury room and told her “I really 
need to talk to you.” JA5982. She informed Judge Bartle 
and counsel that Juror 12 “said more about how they’re 
treating him and what he’s saying to them.” Id. He flatly 
stated that “it’s going to be 11 to 1 no matter what.” Id. 
There were no follow-up questions for the deputy. 
Instead, defense counsel suggested that what Juror 12 may 
have meant was that he was willing to hang the jury 
because of a lack of evidence. They requested that Juror 
12 be asked about his comments to the deputy. 
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After once again summoning Juror 12 to his 
chambers, the Judge advised him that “[s]ome questions 
have arisen” about what he may have done after being voir 
dired the previous day. JA5985. Juror 12 acknowledged 
having conversations with the courtroom deputy. When 
asked “what happened” and “[w]hat occurred,” Juror 12 
responded: “Basically, I said that there was a lot of name 
calling going on.” JA5985. He said comments had been 
made by other jurors about his service in the military. He 
specifically referred to other jurors’ suggesting that he had 
possibly “hit [his] head . . . hard a few times” while 
serving in a parachute regiment. JA5986. He testified he 
had conveyed these comments to the deputy and that he 
found them offensive. When asked if he said anything else 
to the deputy, Juror 12 responded: “I may have. I really 
can’t recall.” JA5987. And when Judge Bartle followed up 
by asking if he could recall anything else that he said to 
the deputy, Juror 12 simply replied: “No. To me, that was 
the most important thing.” Id. Juror 12 was then excused 
from chambers. 
Defense counsel next requested that the juror be 
asked directly whether he told the courtroom deputy that 
he was going to “hang this jury.” JA5988. Juror 12 was 
recalled to chambers, and the following back and forth 
took place: 
The Court: You may be seated. And, of 
course, [Juror 12], you know you’re under 
oath here from yesterday? 
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Juror 12: Yes, sir. 
The Court: . . . Did you say to [the courtroom 
deputy] that you’re going to hang this jury? 
Juror 12: I said I would. 
The Court: You did? 
Juror 12: I did. I said—I told her—I said, we 
don’t agree; I’m not just going to say guilty 
because everybody wants me to, and if that 
hangs this jury, so be it. 
. . . . 
Juror 12: I did say that, sir. 
The Court: You didn’t remember that before? 
Juror 12: I’m more concerned about people 
spitting on my military record. 
The Court: Did you say that you’d hang the 
jury no matter what? 
Juror 12: If they do—if we cannot come to— 
The Court: No. The question is what you said 
to her. Did you say to her you would hang the 
jury no matter what? 
Juror 12: I can’t really remember that. I did 
say that if we didn’t—a person—no matter 
what, I can’t recall that exactly. 
The Court: All right. Thank you very much. 
You can wait just out there in the anteroom. 
JA5989–90. 
Defense counsel continued to oppose Juror 12’s 
dismissal. They argued that the juror’s concern was about 
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the evidence, and that his comments to the courtroom 
deputy reflected a conviction that “he’s not going to agree 
just because others want him to agree.” JA5991. They also 
argued that nothing should be made of Juror 12’s failure 
to mention the comments when initially questioned by the 
Court, and that a supplemental instruction was all that was 
warranted given the early stage of the deliberations. 
The Government strongly disagreed. The Assistant 
United States Attorney argued that Juror 12 “should 
absolutely be removed” because “his demeanor ha[d] 
demonstrated a hostility . . . both to the other jurors and to 
the court.” JA5993. The Government also suggested that 
Juror 12’s comments that he would hang the jury meant 
that he was not participating in the deliberations and was 
ignoring the evidence and the law. 
Ruling from the bench, Judge Bartle announced: 
I find [the deputy clerk] to be credible. I find 
[Juror 12], not to be credible. I find that [Juror 
12] did tell [the deputy clerk] that he was 
going to hang this jury no matter what. 
There have been only approximately 
four hours of deliberation. There’s no way in 
the world he could have reviewed and 
considered all of the evidence in the case and 
my instructions on the law. 
I instructed the jury to deliberate, 
meaning to discuss the evidence; obviously, 
to hold onto your honestly held beliefs, but at 
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least you have to be willing to discuss the 
evidence and participate in the discussion 
with other jurors. 
Juror number 12 has delayed, 
disrupted, impeded, and obstructed the 
deliberative process and had the intent to do 
so. I base that having observed him, based on 
his words and his demeanor before me. 
He wants only to have his own voice 
heard. He has preconceived notions about the 
case. He has violated his oath as a juror. 
And I do not believe that any further 
instructions or admonitions would do any 
good. I think he’s intent on, as he said, 
hanging this jury no matter what the law is, 
no matter what the evidence is. 
Therefore, he will be excused, and I 
will replace him with the next alternate . . . . 
JA5994–95. 
In response, defense counsel moved for a mistrial, 
which the judge promptly denied. He then informed the 
reconstituted jury that deliberations would need to start 
over, and reinstructed them on certain points of law, 
including that the verdict slip does not constitute evidence. 
Judge Bartle elaborated upon his decision to remove 
Juror 12 in two post-trial memorandum opinions. In the 
first, ruling on a media request for the sealed transcripts, 
he explained: 
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Here, there is no doubt that Juror 12 
intentionally refused to deliberate when he 
declared so early in the process that he would 
hang the jury no matter what. This finding 
was predicated on the admission of Juror 12 
as reported by the court’s deputy clerk. The 
facts became clear to the court after hearing 
the credible testimony of the deputy clerk and 
the less credible testimony of Juror 12. The 
demeanor of Juror 12 before the court 
confirmed the court’s findings. 
GSA23–24. The second opinion addressed motions for 
bail pending appeal from Nicholas and Brand. GSA25. 
There, Judge Bartle explained: 
The law is well-settled that the court has 
discretion to act as it did under these 
circumstances. See United States v. Kemp, 
500 F.3d 257, 304 (3d Cir. 2007). The court, 
after taking testimony, specifically found that 
the juror, following only a few hours of 
deliberation, stated to the court’s courtroom 
deputy clerk that he would hang this jury no 
matter what. He could not possibly have 
reviewed all of the law and evidence of this 
five-week trial at the time he made his 
remark. The court examined the deputy clerk 
and the juror under oath in the presence of 
counsel for all parties. The undersigned 
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found the deputy clerk to be credible and the 
juror not to be credible. Based on the juror’s 
demeanor, it was clear he would not change 
his attitude and that his intent had been and 
would continue to be to refuse to deliberate 
in good faith concerning the law and the 
evidence. 
GSA32. 
After deliberating for approximately 15 hours, the 
jury returned with its verdicts on June 21, 2016, finding 
the defendants guilty on most counts. Fattah, Vederman, 
and Brand were convicted on all counts. The jury acquitted 
Bowser on sixteen counts, but found her guilty of the 
bribery conspiracy and the associated charges of bank 
fraud, making false statements to a financial institution, 
falsifying records, and money laundering (Counts 16, 19, 
20, 21 and 22). The jury also acquitted Nicholas of wire 
fraud (Count 24). See Nicholas Supp. App. (NSA) 36. 
The following week, on June 27, the Supreme Court 
issued its opinion in McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. 
Ct. 2355 (2016). McDonnell provided new limitations on 
the definition of “official acts” as used in the honest 
services fraud and bribery statutes under which Fattah and 
Vederman had been convicted. Id. at 2369–72. Fattah and 
Vederman both moved to set aside their convictions. The 
District Court “acknowledge[d] that under McDonnell our 
instructions to the jury on the meaning of official act 
turned out to be incomplete and thus erroneous.” JA103. 
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But the Court held that “the incomplete and thus erroneous 
jury instruction on the meaning of official acts did not 
influence the verdict on the bribery counts” and upheld the 
verdict on Counts 16–18 and 22–23. JA107, 121. 
Fattah, Vederman, and Bowser had more success 
with their other post-verdict motions. The District Court, 
in a thoughtful opinion, granted relief under Federal Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 29, acquitting Vederman of the 
RICO conspiracy (Count 1) and Fattah, Vederman, and 
Bowser of bank fraud, making false statements to a 
financial institution, and falsifying records (Counts 19, 20, 
and 21). JA37–139. 
This appeal followed.8 The defendants raise a 
variety of challenges to their convictions. All defendants 
but Bowser challenge the District Court’s decision to 
dismiss Juror 12. Fattah and Vederman argue that the 
District Court erred in upholding the jury’s verdict on the 
bribery and honest services fraud counts in light of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in McDonnell. Fattah, Brand 
and Nicholas challenge the sufficiency of the evidence 
underlying the RICO conviction. Several of the defendants 
contend the District Court erred in its instruction on intent 
and by sending the indictment out to the jury. There are 
                                              
8 Fattah, Brand, Vederman, and Nicholas each filed a 
timely notice of appeal, but Bowser did not challenge her 
convictions. 
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also several evidentiary challenges.9 The Government 
cross-appeals from the District Court’s judgment 
acquitting Fattah and Vederman on Counts 19 and 20, 
arguing that the District Court erred in interpreting the 
definition of a “mortgage lending business” under 18 
U.S.C. § 27. We address these arguments in turn. 
We hold that the District Court erred in upholding 
the jury verdict in light of McDonnell, and we will 
therefore reverse and remand for retrial on Counts 16, 17, 
18, 22, and 23. We also hold that the District Court erred 
                                              
9 Pursuant to Rule 28(i), “Fattah joins in the arguments of 
Herbert Vederman, Robert Brand, and Karen Nicholas to 
the extent their arguments on appeal apply to Mr. Fattah.” 
Fattah Br. 19 n.69. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 
28(i) provides that a defendant, “[i]n a case involving 
more than one appellant . . . may adopt by reference a part 
of another’s brief.” Here, Fattah’s decision to join fails to 
specify which of the many issues of his codefendants he 
believes worthy of our consideration. Rather, it appears 
that he presumes we will scour the record and make that 
determination for him. This type of blanket request fails to 
satisfy Rule 28(a)(5)’s directive requiring that the 
“appellant’s brief must contain . . . a statement of the 
issues presented for review.” Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(5). We 
conclude that expecting the appellate court to identify the 
issues to be adopted simply results in the abandonment and 
waiver of the unspecified issues. See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 
1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993). 
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in acquitting Fattah and Vederman on Counts 19 and 20. 
Because the jury’s verdict was supported by the evidence, 
we will reinstate the convictions as to those counts. In all 
other respects, we will affirm the judgment of the District 
Court. 
III. Juror Misconduct and Dismissal of Juror 1210 
Defendant Fattah challenges the District Court’s 
decision to conduct an in camera inquiry into alleged juror 
misconduct and the ultimate dismissal of Juror 12.11 We 
reject both challenges. The record reveals credible 
allegations of juror misconduct and a sufficient basis to 
support the finding that Juror 12 violated his oath. 
A. Investigation of Alleged Juror Misconduct 
We first consider whether the District Court erred in 
its handling of the two notes from jurors. A trial court’s 
response to allegations of juror misconduct is reviewed 
under an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. 
Boone, 458 F.3d 321, 326 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing United 
States v. Resko, 3 F.3d 684, 690 (3d Cir. 1993)). We 
conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion 
                                              
10 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 
18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
11 Vederman, Nicholas, and Brand adopt Fattah’s claim of 
reversible error concerning the dismissal of Juror 12. 
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in addressing the issues raised in the jurors’ notes to the 
Court. 
Trial courts are afforded discretion in responding to 
allegations of juror misconduct. This is so because “the 
trial court is in a superior position to observe the ‘mood at 
trial and the predilections of the jury.’ ” Resko, 3 F.3d at 
690 (quoting United States v. Chiantese, 582 F.2d 974, 
980 (5th Cir. 1978)). But this discretion is not unlimited. 
Once the jury retires to deliberate, the confidentiality of its 
deliberations must be closely guarded. An accused is 
constitutionally entitled to be tried before a jury of his 
peers. As ordinary citizens, jurors are “expected to speak, 
debate, argue, and make decisions the way ordinary people 
do in their daily lives.” Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 
S. Ct. 855, 874 (2017) (Alito, J., dissenting). To protect 
against intrusion into a defendant’s right to be judged only 
by fellow citizens, “the door to the jury room [is] locked.” 
Id. at 875. 
In Boone, this Court considered the threshold for 
intervention by a trial judge who is presented with 
allegations of juror misconduct during the course of 
deliberations. 458 F.3d at 327. We recognized that “[i]t is 
beyond question that the secrecy of deliberations is critical 
to the success of the jury system.” Id. at 329. But that 
secrecy abuts a competing interest—the jury’s proper 
execution of its duties. That is, “a juror who refuses to 
deliberate or who commits jury nullification violates the 
sworn jury oath and prevents the jury from fulfilling its 
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constitutional role.” Id. Recognizing these competing 
interests, we declined in Boone to adopt a sweeping 
limitation on a trial court’s ability to investigate 
allegations of misconduct during jury deliberations. See id. 
Consistent with the standard applied at other stages of 
criminal proceedings, Boone teaches that “where 
substantial evidence of jury misconduct—including 
credible allegations of jury nullification or of a refusal to 
deliberate—arises during deliberations, a district court 
may, within its sound discretion, investigate the 
allegations through juror questioning or other appropriate 
means.” Id. 
Fattah argues that the District Court had no basis to 
question any of the jurors. Fattah Br. 20. We disagree. In 
Boone, notes from the jury presented substantial credible 
evidence of misconduct. 458 F.3d at 330. Here, the initial 
note from the foreperson alleged that Juror 12 “refuse[d] 
to vote by the letter of the law,” would “not listen or reason 
with anybody,” and that he had “an agenda or ax to grind” 
with the Government. JA5916. The note contained 
allegations of both a refusal to deliberate and a suggestion 
of nullification. A refusal to deliberate is a violation of a 
juror’s oath. Boone, 458 F.3d at 329 (citing United States 
v. Baker, 262 F.3d 124, 130 (2d Cir. 2001) (“It is well-
settled that jurors have a duty to deliberate.”)). Moreover, 
nullification—a juror’s refusal to follow the law—is a 
violation of the juror’s sworn oath to render a verdict 
according to the law and evidence. See United States v. 
Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 614–18 (2d Cir. 1997) (discussing 
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both “benevolent” and “shameful” examples of juror 
nullification, but “categorically reject[ing] the idea that, in 
a society committed to the rule of law, jury nullification is 
desirable or that courts may permit it to occur when it is 
within their authority to prevent”). The second jury note, 
signed by nine jurors, supported the claim of misconduct 
by asserting that Juror 12 was “incapable of making 
decision[s]” and was “constantly scream[ing]” at the other 
jurors. JA5916–17. We conclude that the District Court 
did not abuse its discretion in deciding to initially question 
Juror 2, and subsequently, Jurors 12, 3, 6 and 1. 
Fattah also challenges the scope of the District 
Court’s questioning. He argues that the rights to an 
impartial jury and to a unanimous verdict “would be 
rendered toothless if trial courts had free rein to question 
jurors during deliberations.” Fattah Br. 36. Indeed, we 
acknowledged the legitimacy of such a concern in Boone. 
Despite adopting a modest “credible allegations” standard 
for investigating misconduct, we “ke[pt] in mind the 
importance of maintaining deliberative secrecy.” Boone, 
458 F.3d at 329. Fattah asserts that the trial court’s 
questions to the five jurors were “intrusive and pointed” 
and “nothing like the questioning . . . approved in Boone.” 
Fattah Br. 38. But Fattah does not elaborate on how, in his 
view, the questions posed by Judge Bartle specifically 
intruded into deliberative secrecy. 
To be sure, Judge Bartle’s questioning of each juror 
was more extemporaneous than the juror questioning in 
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Boone. There, the district court asked a single juror four 
“concise and carefully-worded” questions. 458 F.3d at 
330. Judge Bartle’s voir dire of each of the five jurors took 
on a more conversational tone. We take no issue with that 
approach. The substance of the judge’s questions was 
limited and mirrored that of questions we deemed 
appropriate in Kemp. There, the court conducted three 
rounds of questioning. In the first round, each juror was 
asked: 
(1) “Are you personally experiencing any 
problems with how the deliberations are 
proceeding without telling us anything about 
the votes as to guilt or innocence? If yes, 
describe the problem.” (2) “Are all the jurors 
discussing the evidence or lack of evidence?” 
(3) “Are all the jurors following the court’s 
instructions on the law?” 
Kemp, 500 F.3d at 273. In the second and third rounds, 
each juror was asked: 
(1) “Is there any juror or jurors who are 
refusing to deliberate?” (2) “Is there any juror 
who is refusing to discuss the evidence or 
lack of evidence?” (3) “Is there any juror who 
is refusing to follow the Court’s 
instructions?” 
Id. at 274. Here, Judge Bartle began his voir dire of each 
juror by stating that he did not wish for the juror to discuss 
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the merits of the case or to reveal the content of the 
deliberations that had taken place. He asked the jurors 
whether screaming was occurring, whether the jurors were 
discussing the evidence, whether Juror 12 was placing his 
hands on other jurors, and whether Juror 12 was unwilling 
to follow his instructions. 
Fattah points to no specific question posed or topic 
discussed that was inappropriate, and we see little to no 
substantive difference between the questions here and 
those asked by the trial judge in Kemp. As in Kemp, “the 
District Court took care to limit its questions to appropriate 
matters that did not touch on the merits of the jury’s 
deliberation, and expressly informed each juror on 
multiple occasions that he or she should not reveal the 
substance of the deliberations.” Id. at 302 (citing United 
States v. Edwards, 303 F.3d 606, 634 n.16 (5th Cir. 2002)). 
Fattah also argues that once the remarks of Juror 2 
and Juror 12 revealed no further evidence of misconduct, 
the court had no basis to question other jurors. Fattah 
Reply 19. Yet, our cases make clear that a trial court may, 
in its discretion, examine each juror. Kemp, 500 F.3d at 
302 (“We have recognized that there are times in which 
individual questioning is the optimal way in which to root 
out misconduct.”). Indeed, “the District Court must utilize 
procedures that will ‘provide a reasonable assurance for 
the discovery of prejudice.’ ” Id. (quoting Martin v. 
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Warden, Huntingdon State Corr. Inst., 653 F.2d 799, 807 
(3d Cir. 1981)).12 
Judge Bartle, a very able and experienced district 
judge, was in the best position to determine what type of 
inquiry was warranted under the circumstances. We 
conclude that his questioning of the five jurors was not an 
abuse of discretion. See id. at 302. 
B. Dismissal of Juror 12 
Fattah, joined by Vederman, Brand, and Nicholas, 
strongly contends that the District Court committed 
reversible error by dismissing Juror 12. “We review the 
dismissal of a juror for cause for abuse of discretion.” 
                                              
12 Our cases do not suggest that a trial judge confronted 
with allegations that a jury’s deliberations are being 
obstructed by one of its members should always resort to 
interviewing jurors. Reinstructing the jury on its duty to 
deliberate will often be the better course at the first sign of 
trouble. Mere disagreement among jurors—even spirited 
disagreement—is no ground for intervention. 
Furthermore, intrusive or leading questions about the 
deliberative process may work against the twin goals of 
protecting that process and ensuring that jurors remain 
faithful to their oaths. We share the Eleventh Circuit’s 
preference of “err[ing] on the side of too little inquiry as 
opposed to too much.” United States v. Oscar, 877 F.3d 
1270, 1287 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. 
Augustin, 661 F.3d 1105, 1133 (11th Cir. 2011)). 
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Kemp, 500 F.3d at 303. That deferential standard compels 
us to affirm. 
Rule 23(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure permits a trial court to excuse a deliberating 
juror for good cause. See id. (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 
23(b)). Good cause exists where a juror refuses to apply 
the law, refuses to follow the court’s instructions, refuses 
to deliberate with his or her fellow jurors, or demonstrates 
bias. See Kemp, 500 F.3d at 305–06; United States v. 
Oscar, 877 F.3d 1270, 1287 (11th Cir. 2017); Thomas, 116 
F.3d at 617. Good cause does not exist when there is 
reasonable but sustained disagreement about how a juror 
views the evidence. The courts of appeals are emphatic 
that trial courts “may not dismiss a juror during 
deliberations if the request for discharge stems from 
doubts the juror harbors about the sufficiency of the 
government’s evidence.” Kemp, 500 F.3d at 303 (quoting 
United States v. Brown, 823 F.2d 591, 596 (D.C. Cir. 
1987)); see also Oscar, 877 F.3d at 1287 (same); United 
States v. Symington, 195 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 1999); 
Thomas, 116 F.3d at 622. 
To reinforce a defendant’s right to a unanimous 
jury, we have adopted a high standard for juror dismissal. 
Kemp, 500 F.3d at 304 & n.26. “[D]istrict courts may 
discharge a juror for bias, failure to deliberate, failure to 
follow the district court’s instructions, or jury nullification 
when there is no reasonable possibility that the allegations 
of misconduct stem from the juror’s view of the evidence.” 
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Id. at 304 (emphasis added). This “no reasonable 
possibility” standard is “by no means lax.” Id. Rather, “[i]t 
corresponds with the burden for establishing guilt in a 
criminal trial.” Id. 
We first applied this standard in Kemp, but have not 
had occasion to do so since. There, the evidence 
supporting the district court’s removal decision was 
“overwhelming.” 500 F.3d at 304. Ten jurors separately 
and consistently reported that a juror was improperly 
biased, and did so only after three rounds of questioning 
and careful and correct instructions from the district court 
as to the distinction between appropriate skepticism and 
impermissible bias. Id. at 304–05; see id. at 275–76 
(district court’s instruction). The testimony also showed 
that the juror in question refused to deliberate or to discuss 
the evidence with her fellow jurors. Id. at 305. 
Whether the evidence of misconduct in this case is 
as strong as that in Kemp is beside the point. After only 
four hours of deliberations, Juror 12 stated unequivocally 
to the courtroom deputy that he was “going to hang” the 
jury, and that it would be “11 to 1 no matter what.” 
JA5981–82 (emphasis added). These statements, coupled 
with the District Court’s finding that Juror 12 lacked 
credibility, provided a sufficient basis for Juror 12’s 
dismissal. 
As grounds for excusing Juror 12, the District Court 
found that he refused to deliberate in good faith, “delayed, 
disrupted, impeded, and obstructed the deliberative 
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process and had the intent to do so,” JA5995, and that he 
was “intent on . . . hanging this jury no matter what the law 
is, no matter what the evidence is.” Id. The District Court 
determined from this that Juror 12 had violated his oath as 
a juror and that no further instructions or admonitions 
could rehabilitate the juror. Id. The District Court based 
these findings on personal observation, including Juror 
12’s words and demeanor, and making the specific finding 
that Juror 12 was not credible. That finding is amply 
supported by the record. 
In United States v. Abbell, 271 F.3d 1286, 1303 (9th 
Cir. 2001), the Ninth Circuit recognized that “the 
demeanor of the pertinent juror is important to juror 
misconduct determinations” because the “juror’s 
motivations and intentions are at issue.” That court 
emphasized, as we do, that a district judge is best situated 
to assess the demeanor of a juror. Id. Here, Juror 12 stated 
he could not recall putting his hand on another juror’s 
shoulder, while his fellow jurors’ testimony was consistent 
on this point. Juror 12 also failed, at first, to recall his 
troubling statements to the courtroom deputy despite 
having made those statements only the previous afternoon. 
When questioned a second time and asked directly about 
the statements, he admitted to saying that he would hang 
the jury but claimed he could not “really remember” 
saying “no matter what” the day before. JA5989–90. Juror 
12’s spotty recollection of the previous day’s events 
further supports the District Court’s finding that he was 
not credible. 
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Fattah argues that the credibility determination was 
not, by itself, a sufficient reason to dismiss the juror 
because the record demonstrates more than a reasonable 
possibility that the complaints about his conduct stemmed 
from Juror 12’s own view of the Government’s case. 
Fattah Reply Br. 11; Fattah Br. 25, 28. Fattah claims that 
the District Court abused its discretion by dismissing Juror 
12 “on the basis of, in effect, six words the juror 
purportedly said to the court’s deputy after he was verbally 
attacked by other jurors.” Fattah Br. 24. According to 
Fattah, the questioning of the other jurors “confirmed that 
there were no legitimate grounds for removing juror 12.” 
Id. at 26. We conclude otherwise. 
“A district court’s finding on the question whether 
a juror has impermissibly refused to participate in the 
deliberation process is a finding of fact to which 
appropriate deference is due.” Baker, 262 F.3d at 130. 
While district courts must apply a high standard for juror 
dismissal, their underlying findings are afforded 
considerable deference on appeal. Kemp, 500 F.3d at 304 
(citing Abbell, 271 F.3d at 1302–03). We will reverse only 
if the decision to dismiss a juror was “without factual 
support, or for a legally irrelevant reason.” Abbell, 271 
F.3d at 1302 (citation omitted). 
Here, the District Court had a legitimate reason for 
removing Juror 12. Refusal to deliberate constitutes good 
cause for dismissal. Although the judge did not expressly 
articulate the Kemp standard when he announced that he 
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would dismiss Juror 12, he did acknowledge the “no 
reasonable possibility” standard in his discussion with 
counsel. The unmistakable import of the District Court’s 
statement from the bench is that there was no reasonable 
possibility that Juror 12’s intransigence was based on his 
view of the evidence. See Oscar, 877 F.3d at 1288 n.16. 
Fattah contends that there is no record support for 
the finding that Juror 12 said “he was going to hang this 
jury no matter what.” Fattah Br. 29. To be sure, the 
courtroom deputy’s testimony is not that Juror 12 used the 
words “hang this jury” and “no matter what” in the same 
sentence. She testified that Juror 12 first stated “I am going 
to hang this jury,” then later stated “it is going to be 11 to 
1 no matter what.” JA5981–82. This is a distinction 
without a difference. Likewise, Fattah challenges the 
District Court’s finding that Juror 12 was determined to 
hang the jury “no matter what the law is” and “no matter 
what the evidence is.” Fattah Br. 29. Although there is no 
evidence that Juror 12 uttered the phrases “no matter what 
the law is” or “no matter what the evidence is,” the District 
Court was describing the import of Juror 12’s statements. 
This was not error. 
Fattah expresses the concern that “[i]f jurors are 
asked the right questions or interrogated long enough, it 
would not be difficult for a trial court to elicit testimony 
from [a] majority [of] jurors that can be held up as 
evidence of a dissenting juror’s bias or refusal to 
deliberate.” Fattah Br. 22. He also worries that a group of 
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jurors might have an incentive to rid themselves of a juror 
who holds a different view. Id. These are valid concerns—
but no basis existed for such concerns in this case. Juror 
12’s own words provided most of the support for his 
eventual dismissal. Furthermore, his statements were 
made early in the deliberations, in a complex case, before 
any juror could reasonably be expected to have reached 
final verdicts on the twenty-nine counts before the jury. 
The able District Judge did not err in finding that 
Juror 12 refused to deliberate and therefore violated his 
oath. 
IV. The District Court’s Instructions Under 
McDonnell 
On appeal, Fattah and Vederman renew their 
challenge to the jury instructions given on Counts 3, 16, 
17, 18, 22, and 23, concerning the meaning of the term 
“official act” as used in the bribery statute (pursuant to 
which both were convicted) and the honest services fraud 
statute (pursuant to which Fattah alone was convicted). 
In light of the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016), 
released the week after the jury verdict, the District Court 
conceded that its instructions were incomplete and 
erroneous, at least as to Counts 16–18. Nevertheless, the 
District Court held that the erroneous jury instructions had 
not influenced the verdict on the bribery counts, and 
declined to set aside Fattah and Vederman’s convictions. 
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As to Counts 16–18 and 22–23, we disagree, and will 
reverse the District Court’s judgment. The District Court’s 
judgment with respect to Count 3, which did not involve 
Vederman, will be affirmed. JA78–79. 
A. The McDonnell Framework 
In McDonnell, the Supreme Court interpreted the 
term “official act” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3). 136 
S. Ct. at 2368. The statute defines an “official act” as “any 
decision or action on any question, matter, cause, suit, 
proceeding or controversy, which may at any time be 
pending, or which may by law be brought before any 
public official, in such official’s official capacity, or in 
such official’s place of trust or profit.” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 201(a)(3). The McDonnell Court distilled this definition 
into two requirements: 
First, the Government must identify a 
“question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or 
controversy” that “may at any time be 
pending” or “may by law be brought” before 
a public official. Second, the Government 
must prove that the public official made a 
decision or took an action “on” that question, 
matter, cause, suit, proceeding, or 
controversy, or agreed to do so. 
136 S. Ct. at 2368. Applying this two-step test to Governor 
Robert McDonnell’s convictions, the Supreme Court 
concluded that “the jury was not correctly instructed on 
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the meaning of ‘official act,’ ” and as a result, “may have 
convicted Governor McDonnell for conduct that is not 
unlawful.” Id. at 2375. Given that uncertainty, the Court 
“[could not] conclude that the errors in the jury 
instructions were ‘harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” 
Id. (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 16 (1999)). 
The Supreme Court, therefore, vacated Governor 
McDonnell’s convictions. Id. 
McDonnell lays out a clear path for the Government 
to follow in proving that an accused has performed an 
“official act.” First, the Government must “identify a 
‘question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy’ 
that ‘may at any time be pending’ or ‘may by law be 
brought’ before a public official.” 136 S. Ct. at 2368 
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3)). This first step is divided 
into two sub-components. In Step 1(A), the Government 
must “identify a ‘question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding 
or controversy.’ ” Id. Step 1(B) then clarifies that the 
identified “question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or 
controversy” be one that “ ‘may at any time be pending’ or 
‘may by law be brought’ before a public official.” Id. 
Under Step 1(A), a “question, matter, cause, suit, 
proceeding or controversy” must be “a formal exercise of 
governmental power that is similar in nature to a lawsuit 
before a court, a determination before an agency, or a 
hearing before a committee.” Id. at 2372. Importantly, “a 
typical meeting, telephone call, or event arranged by a 
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public official” does not qualify as such a formal exercise 
of governmental power. Id. at 2368. 
Step 1(B) then requires us to ask whether the 
qualifying “question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or 
controversy” was one that “ ‘may at any time be pending’ 
or ‘may by law be brought’ before a public official.” Id. 
As the McDonnell Court clarified, “ ‘[p]ending’ and ‘may 
by law be brought’ suggest something that is relatively 
circumscribed—the kind of thing that can be put on an 
agenda, tracked for progress, and then checked off as 
complete.” Id. at 2369; accord United States v. Repak, 852 
F.3d 230, 252 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting McDonnell, 136 S. 
Ct. at 2369). By contrast, matters described at a high level 
of generality—for example, “[e]conomic development,” 
“justice,” and “national security”—are not sufficiently 
“focused and concrete.” McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2369. 
In McDonnell, the Court concluded that at least 
three questions or matters identified by the Fourth Circuit 
were sufficiently focused: 
(1) whether researchers at any of Virginia’s 
state universities would initiate a study of [a 
drug]; (2) whether the state-created Tobacco 
Indemnification and Community 
Revitalization Commission would allocate 
grant money for the study of [a chemical 
compound]; and (3) whether the health 
insurance plan for state employees in 
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Virginia would include [a specific drug] as a 
covered drug. 
Id. at 2370 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting United 
States v. McDonnell, 792 F.3d 478, 515–16 (4th Cir. 
2015)). We provided guidance in the form of a fourth 
example in Repak, when we held that a redevelopment 
authority’s awarding of contracts was “a concrete 
determination made by the [redevelopment authority’s] 
Board of Directors.” 852 F.3d at 253. 
Step 2 requires the Government to prove that the 
public official made a “decision” or took “an action” on 
the identified “question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or 
controversy.” McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2368. The 
McDonnell Court explained: 
Setting up a meeting, hosting an event, or 
calling an official (or agreeing to do so) 
merely to talk about a research study or to 
gather additional information . . . does not 
qualify as a decision or action on the pending 
question of whether to initiate the study. 
Simply expressing support for the research 
study at a meeting, event, or call—or sending 
a subordinate to such a meeting, event, or 
call—similarly does not qualify as a decision 
or action on the study, as long as the public 
official does not intend to exert pressure on 
another official or provide advice, knowing 
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or intending such advice to form the basis for 
an “official act.” 
Id. at 2371. The Court further clarified: 
If an official sets up a meeting, hosts an 
event, or makes a phone call on a question or 
matter that is or could be pending before 
another official, that could serve as evidence 
of an agreement to take an official act. A jury 
could conclude, for example, that the official 
was attempting to pressure or advise another 
official on a pending matter. And if the 
official agreed to exert that pressure or give 
that advice in exchange for a thing of value, 
that would be illegal. 
Id. 
Here, Fattah was charged with engaging in three 
categories of official acts, which we analyze in accordance 
with the McDonnell framework. In Counts 16–18 and 22–
23, Fattah is alleged to have set up a meeting between 
Vederman and the U.S. Trade Representative, attempted 
to secure Vederman an ambassadorship, and hired 
Vederman’s girlfriend, all in return for a course of conduct 
wherein Vederman provided things of value to Fattah. 
In this case, as in McDonnell, the jury instructions 
were erroneous. We conclude that the first category of the 
charged acts—setting up a meeting between Vederman 
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and the U.S. Trade Representative—is not unlawful, and 
that the second category—attempting to secure Vederman 
an ambassadorship—requires reconsideration by a 
properly instructed jury. The third charged act—hiring 
Vederman’s girlfriend—is clearly an official act. But 
because we cannot isolate the jury’s consideration of the 
hiring from the first two categories of charged acts, we 
must reverse and remand the judgment of the District 
Court. 
B. The Kirk Meeting 
We turn first to Fattah’s scheduling of a meeting 
between Vederman and the U.S. Trade Representative, 
Ron Kirk. Under McDonnell, “setting up a meeting . . . 
does not, standing alone, qualify as an ‘official act.’ ” 136 
S. Ct. at 2368. Fattah’s setting up the meeting between 
Vederman and Kirk was therefore not an official act, a 
concession implicit in the Government’s opening brief. 
See Gov’t Br. 32 (failing to mention the Kirk meeting as 
one of the “two categories” of allegedly “official acts”). 
But the jury was not properly instructed on this point. 
Without the benefit of the principles laid down in 
McDonnell, the jury was free to conclude that arranging 
the Kirk meeting was an official act—and it may have 
done so. The District Court’s erroneous jury instructions, 
therefore, cannot survive harmless error review. 
In a footnote in its brief to this Court, the 
Government argues that evidence about the Kirk meeting 
was offered only “because it established the strength of 
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Vederman’s desire to be an ambassador” and not because 
the Government was attempting to establish the meeting 
as an independent official act. Id. at79–80 n.6. But the 
record undercuts the Government’s post hoc justification. 
The indictment, provided to the jury in redacted 
form for use in its deliberations, lists Fattah’s setting up 
the Kirk meeting as an official act under the heading 
“FATTAH’s Official Acts for VEDERMAN.” JA494. 
Under this heading are three distinct subheadings: 
(1) “The Pursuit of an Ambassadorship,” (2) “The Pursuit 
of Another Executive Branch Position,” and (3) “Hiring 
the Lobbyist’s Girlfriend to the Congressional Staff.” 
JA494–95. The second subheading, “The Pursuit of 
Another Executive Branch Position,” describes the 
arrangement of the Kirk meeting. Quite clearly, then, this 
three-part structure demonstrates that setting up the Kirk 
meeting was one of three distinct categories of official acts 
alleged by the Government. 
Although there is some support for the 
Government’s argument that evidence of the Kirk meeting 
was presented at trial only to establish the extent of 
Vederman’s interest in becoming an ambassador, JA827, 
852–53 (mentioning the Kirk meeting in close proximity 
to references to Fattah’s attempts to secure Vederman an 
ambassadorship), it is undermined by language in the 
redacted indictment itself, and by the way in which the 
Government presented its case at trial as a “pattern” of 
connected acts. 
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The redacted indictment, for example, refers to the 
Kirk meeting as “The Pursuit of Another Executive 
Branch Position.” JA495 (emphasis added). The use of the 
word “Another” strongly suggests that evidence about the 
Kirk meeting was not merely evidence of Fattah’s attempt 
to secure Vederman an ambassadorship, but was also 
evidence of a separate and distinct attempt to secure 
Vederman a position on a federal trade-related 
commission. The redacted indictment also notes that “[i]n 
or around May 2011, with little progress made on securing 
an ambassadorship for VEDERMAN, FATTAH turned 
towards obtaining for VEDERMAN an appointment in the 
Executive Branch to a federal trade commission.” Id. 
(emphasis added). The words “turned towards,” taken 
literally, clearly convey that arranging the Kirk meeting 
was presented as distinct from Fattah’s efforts to secure 
Vederman an ambassadorship. 
The District Court denied Fattah and Vederman a 
new trial on Counts 17 and 18, referring to evidence of the 
Kirk meeting as “de minimis” and noting that “Kirk’s 
testimony during this lengthy trial lasted a mere sixteen 
minutes.” JA97 n.14. In the District Court’s view, 
evidence of the Kirk meeting “played no role in the 
outcome” of the case. Id. Considering the record in light 
of McDonnell, we are not so sure. 
Although it is possible that evidence of the Kirk 
meeting played a minor role at trial when compared to the 
other acts on which the Government presented evidence, 
79 
the redacted indictment suggests that the Kirk meeting was 
a significant part of the Government’s case. The 
indictment dedicates five paragraphs to describing the 
Kirk meeting, but just three paragraphs to describing the 
hiring of Vederman’s girlfriend—a hiring that, as we 
explain below, is clearly an official act. JA495–96. While 
neither the number of minutes used at trial nor the number 
of paragraphs contained in an indictment is a dispositive 
unit of measurement for determining the significance of 
evidence, we conclude that the District Court’s erroneous 
jury instructions pertaining to the Kirk meeting were not 
harmless. 
We conclude, in accordance with McDonnell, that 
Fattah’s arranging a meeting between Vederman and the 
U.S. Trade Representative was not itself an official act. 
Because the jury may have convicted Fattah for conduct 
that is not unlawful, we cannot conclude that the error in 
the jury instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and we must vacate and remand the convictions of 
Fattah and Vederman as to Counts 16, 17, 18, 22 and 23. 
C. Fattah’s Efforts to Secure Vederman an 
Ambassadorship 
The nature of Fattah’s efforts to secure Vederman 
an ambassadorship is less clear, and presents a closer 
question than the Kirk meeting. We ultimately conclude 
that the question warrants remand so that it may be 
answered by a properly instructed jury. On remand, the 
jury must decide whether Fattah’s conduct constituted a 
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“decision” or “action” under Step 2 of the McDonnell 
analysis. 
At the outset, it is clear to us that, under Steps 1(A) 
and 1(B), a formal appointment of Vederman as an 
ambassador would qualify as a “matter” that “may at any 
time be pending” before a public official. The formal 
appointment of a particular person (Vederman), to a 
specific position (an ambassadorship), constitutes a matter 
that is sufficiently focused and concrete. The formal 
appointment of an ambassador is a matter that is “pending” 
before the President—the constitutional actor charged 
with nominating ambassadors—as well Senators, who are 
charged with confirming the President’s ambassadorial 
nominations. U.S. Const. art. II § 2 (“[H]e shall nominate, 
and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, 
shall appoint Ambassadors . . . .”). It is beyond cavil that 
the formal appointment of an ambassador satisfies both 
sub-components of McDonnell’s Step 1. 
Turning to Step 2, we consider whether Fattah’s 
efforts to secure Vederman an ambassadorship qualify as 
making a “decision” or taking “an action” on the identified 
“matter” of appointment. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2368. 
Although those efforts—three emails, two letters, and one 
phone call—do not themselves qualify as a “question, 
matter, cause, suit, proceeding, or controversy” under 
McDonnell’s Step 1, they may nonetheless qualify as the 
making of a “decision” or taking “an action” on the 
identified matter of appointment. Id. 
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McDonnell’s Step 2 requires us to determine 
whether Fattah’s efforts qualify as permissible attempts to 
“express[] support,” or impermissible attempts “to 
pressure or advise another official on a pending matter.” 
Id. at 2371. At trial, the jury was not instructed that they 
had to place Fattah’s efforts on one side or the other of this 
divide. The jury might even have thought they were 
permitted to find Fattah’s efforts—three emails, two 
letters, and one phone call—to themselves be official acts, 
rather than a “decision” or “action” on the properly 
identified matter of appointment. Such a determination 
would have been contrary to the dictates of McDonnell. 
Faced with such uncertainty, we cannot assume the 
jury verdict was proper. Although the jury might not have 
concluded that Fattah’s efforts were themselves official 
acts, and although the jury might not have concluded that 
those efforts crossed the line into impermissible attempts 
“to pressure or advise,” we are unable to conclude that the 
jury necessarily did so. Nor can we, on the cold record 
before us, determine whether Fattah’s efforts to secure 
Vederman an ambassadorship crossed the line. 
Determining, for example, just how forceful a strongly 
worded letter of recommendation must be before it 
becomes impermissible “pressure or advice” is a fact-
intensive inquiry that falls within the domain of a properly 
instructed jury. Should the Government elect to retry these 
counts after remand, the finder of fact will need to decide 
whether Fattah’s efforts constituted permissible attempts 
to “express[] support,” or impermissible attempts “to 
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pressure or advise another official on a pending matter.” 
Id. 
D. The Zionts Hiring 
The third group of acts charged in the Fattah–
Vederman scheme involves Fattah’s decision to hire 
Vederman’s girlfriend, Alexandra Zionts, as a 
congressional staffer. We conclude that the hiring was an 
official act. A brief analysis of McDonnell’s two steps 
suffices to show why this is so. 
Here, under McDonnell’s Step 1(A), the relevant 
“matter” is the decision to hire Zionts. Step 1(B) of the 
analysis is satisfied because the hiring decision was 
“pending” before Fattah himself. And that hiring was 
“focused and concrete,” “within the specific duties of an 
official’s position—the function conferred by the 
authority of his office.” Id. at 2369. Finally, McDonnell’s 
Step 2 requires that the “Government . . . prove that the 
public official made a decision or took an action ‘on’ [the 
identified] question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding, or 
controversy, or agreed to do so.” Id. at 2368. Fattah’s 
decision to hire Zionts clearly satisfies that requirement. 
We therefore conclude that the hiring of Zionts was an 
official act under McDonnell. 
Vederman concedes that the Zionts hiring was an 
official act. Oral Argument Transcript at 5–6. Fattah, for 
his part, maintains that “hiring someone for a routine, part-
time, short-term position falls well outside [the] definition 
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[of ‘official act’] and is nothing like a lawsuit, agency 
determination, or committee hearing, even if each shares 
the happenstance that federal funds will be used.” Fattah 
Reply Br. 25. 
Fattah’s argument lacks traction. Official acts need 
not be momentous decisions—or even notable ones. 
Judges, for example, make “routine” evidentiary rulings 
every day, and yet it is beyond question that those rulings 
are official acts. In the realm of official acts, it is of no 
moment that Zionts provided only “part-time, short term” 
labor. When a public official hires an employee to work in 
his government office, he has engaged in an official act. 
* * * 
If we could conclude that the Zionts hiring was the 
only category of actions that the jury relied on when it 
found that Fattah performed an official act under Counts 
16–18 and 22–23, remand would not be necessary. But, as 
we have explained, we cannot rule out that the jury 
erroneously convicted Fattah and Vederman based on 
other actions that were not official acts under 
McDonnell.13 
                                              
13 More specifically, the incomplete, and therefore 
erroneous, instructions could have led the jury to commit 
at least one of three mistakes. First, the jury could have 
improperly convicted Vederman and Fattah based on the 
Kirk meeting alone, or misunderstood the Kirk meeting to 
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The Government argues that because the Zionts 
hiring was an official act, the effect of the erroneous jury 
instructions could be no more than harmless. The jury’s 
verdict, the Government contends, permits us to deduce 
that the jury necessarily concluded the Zionts hiring was 
an official act, and that this conclusion alone supported 
Fattah’s and Vederman’s convictions as to Counts 16–18 
and 22–23—regardless of whether the jury erroneously 
found any unofficial acts to be official acts. We disagree. 
Fattah and Vederman objected to the definition of 
“official act” at trial. We thus apply the harmless error 
standard of review. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2375. The 
Government argues that because the jury convicted Fattah 
and Vederman of illegally laundering the proceeds of a 
“scheme to commit bribery” under Count 23, the jury 
found that the scheme must have encompassed only the 
Zionts hiring. JA531.That would mean that the jury did not 
conclude that the “scheme to commit bribery” included 
                                              
be a necessary component of an impermissible “pattern” 
of official acts. Second, the jury might have concluded that 
Fattah’s efforts to secure Vederman an ambassadorship 
were themselves official acts. Third, the jury might have 
concluded that Fattah’s efforts to secure Vederman an 
ambassadorship were merely attempts to “express[] 
support,” rather than to “exert pressure . . . or provide 
advice,” but nonetheless erroneously concluded that those 
expressions of support were official acts. McDonnell, 136 
S. Ct. at 2371. 
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any acts that McDonnell now makes clear were unofficial. 
Yet the redacted indictment, jury instructions, and the fact 
that the Government presented its case under a “pattern” 
theory at trial compel us to reject the Government’s 
argument. 
The very first sentence under Count 23 of the 
redacted indictment incorporates all three categories of 
“Overt Acts” contained within paragraphs “58 through 95 
of Count One.”14 All three of these categories fall under a 
general heading within the redacted indictment titled “The 
Bribery and Fraud Scheme [redacted].” JA494. The jury 
had before it instructions for Count 23 which referred to 
“the alleged bribery scheme involving an $18,000 
payment,” JA448 (emphasis added), and the redacted 
indictment which referred to “a scheme to commit 
bribery,” JA531 (emphasis added). The parallel language 
could well lead a rational jury to conclude that the relevant 
“scheme” included all three categories of acts listed under 
the general heading: “The Bribery and Fraud Scheme 
[redacted].” JA494 (emphasis added). 
                                              
14 JA531. Paragraphs 58 through 95 of Count 1 refer to the 
three categories of allegedly official acts discussed above: 
(1) “The Pursuit of an Ambassadorship,” (2) “The Pursuit 
of Another Executive Branch Position,” and (3) the 
“Hiring of the Lobbyist’s Girlfriend to the Congressional 
Staff.” JA494–95. 
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Like the redacted indictment and jury instructions, 
the Government’s trial arguments referred to patterns and 
a course of conduct, and stressed that the jury need not 
connect specific payments to particular official acts. In its 
closing argument to the jury, the Government stated that 
the alleged “scheme took place over a period of several 
years. Over and over again you’re going to see the same 
pattern.” JA5383 (emphasis added). Then, in its rebuttal 
argument, the Government went out of its way to 
explicitly distinguish its “pattern” theory from an 
alternative theory that would have directly connected 
individual payments to individual acts. As the prosecutor 
argued to the jury: 
Ms. Recker appears to argue that each thing 
of value must coincide with some specific 
official act, but that is not the law and that is 
not what Judge Bartle is going to instruct you. 
Instead what he will tell you is that the 
government is not required to prove that 
Vederman intended to influence Fattah to 
perform a set number of official acts in return 
for things of value so long as the evidence 
shows a course of conduct of giving things of 
value, things of value to Fattah in exchange 
for a pattern of official acts favorable to 
Vederman. In other words a stream of 
benefits. These for those, not this for that. 
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JA5715–16 (emphases added). In closing to the jury, the 
Government made several other references to this 
“pattern” theory,15 and the District Court referred to this 
“pattern” theory in its instructions to the jury. As Judge 
Bartle instructed: 
[I]t is not necessary for the government to 
prove that a defendant intended to induce a 
public official to perform a number of official 
acts in return for things of value. 
So as long as the evidence shows a 
course of conduct of giving things of value to 
a public official in exchange for a pattern of 
official acts favorable to the giver. 
JA5833–34 (emphasis added). On appeal, the Government 
changes course, asking us to assume that the jury ignored 
these repeated references to a “pattern of official acts” and 
                                              
15 See, e.g., JA5389 (“And the exchange of an official act 
for a thing of value is called a bribe. There’s the pattern. 
Fattah needs money, Vederman gets an official act.”); JA 
5393 (“That’s why you see the pattern over and over again. 
Fattah needs money, Vederman gets an official act.”); 
JA5400 (“The same pattern we saw over and over again. 
Fattah needs money, Vederman gets an official act.”); 
JA5409 (“[Y]ou know that these were bribes because of 
the pattern you saw over and over and over again. Fattah 
needs money, Vederman gets an official act, that makes 
these things a bribe.”). 
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instead considered the Zionts hiring and Vederman’s 
$18,000 payment to Fattah as an isolated quid pro quo. 
This is an invitation to speculate, and we decline to do so.16 
The jury began its deliberations accompanied by a copy of 
the redacted indictment which alleged a pattern of official 
acts, consisting of any combination of three categories of 
acts: pursuing an ambassadorship, arranging the Kirk 
meeting, and hiring Zionts. In light of the erroneous 
instructions, and because only one category clearly 
                                              
16 Providing some support to the Government’s ultimately 
unconvincing argument that the jury considered the Zionts 
hiring and $18,000 payment in isolation, we note that the 
redacted indictment does mention those two events side-
by-side in paragraph 78 of the indictment’s Part V. JA497 
(“On January 13, 2012, VEDERMAN wired $18,000 to 
FATTAH, and six days later, on January 19, 2012, 
BOWSER emailed VEDERMAN’s girlfriend, A.Z., 
welcoming her as a new employee to FATTAH’s 
Congressional Staff.”). But although paragraph 78 
mentions the $18,000 wire transfer and the Zionts hiring 
in the same breath, paragraph 78 does not instruct the jury 
to connect these two events apart from the rest of the 
evidence presented at trial. In light of the other instructions 
and arguments indicating that the jury should not consider 
the Zionts hiring in isolation, but instead should consider 
the hiring as one part of a three-part scheme, paragraph 78 
is not sufficient to avoid a reversal and remand on the 
convictions of Fattah and Vederman as to Counts 16–18 
and 22–23. 
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qualifies as an “official act,” the jury’s deliberations were 
fraught with the potential for McDonnell error. We will 
vacate the convictions of Fattah and Vederman as to 
Counts 16, 17, 18, 22, and 23, and remand to the District 
Court. 
E. Vederman’s Sufficiency Challenge to Counts 16–18 
and 22–23 
Vederman argues that there is insufficient evidence 
to support a conviction, even if a jury were properly 
instructed under McDonnell. Specifically, Vederman 
argues that there is insufficient evidence to convict him 
and Fattah, after remand, on Counts 16–18 and 22–23 
because “[a]t least seven of the eight alleged ‘official acts’ 
were, as a matter of law, not official at all.” Vederman Br. 
35. As to the single act that Vederman implicitly concedes 
to be an official act—the Zionts hiring—Vederman argues 
that “[t]he only thing that even arguably associates” the 
Zionts hiring with Vederman was its timing in relation to 
Vederman’s sham purchase of the Fattahs’ Porsche. Id. 
According to Vederman, “the undisputed chronology 
precludes any inference that Vederman conferred this 
benefit on his friend as an illegal bribe.” Id. (emphasis 
omitted). Vederman is wrong. Sufficient evidence was 
produced at trial to have allowed a properly-instructed jury 
to convict Fattah and Vederman of Counts 16–18 and 22–
23. 
To begin with, even if the Zionts hiring had been the 
sole official act to survive this Court’s interpretation of 
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McDonnell, there would still be sufficient evidence to 
convict Fattah and Vederman. Zionts did not receive 
written notice of her official hiring until six days after the 
sham Porsche purchase. Moreover, the jury would not be 
restricted to considering the chronology of the sham 
purchase alone. It would be free to consider Vederman’s 
entire course of conduct. Under the general heading 
“VEDERMAN’S Payments and Things of Value to 
FATTAH,” the redacted indictment not only refers to the 
$18,000 wire transaction from Vederman to Fattah as part 
of the sham Porsche purchase, but also to Vederman’s 
$3,000 payment for the college tuition of Simone Muller, 
Fattah’s live-in au pair, as well as thousands of dollars in 
payments made by Vederman for Chip Fattah’s college 
tuition. JA496–97. 
And the Zionts hiring is not the only act to survive 
our application of McDonnell. As we explained, a jury 
could find that Fattah’s efforts to secure Vederman an 
ambassadorship—three emails, two letters, and a phone 
call—were an impermissible attempt to “pressure or 
advise” President Obama, Senator Casey, or both men.17 
                                              
17 Although Fattah’s efforts to secure Vederman an 
ambassadorship present a jury question that is not for us to 
answer on appeal, we note that not one of these efforts 
alone could qualify as an official act itself. See McDonnell, 
136 S. Ct. at 2372 (“Setting up a meeting, talking to 
another official, or organizing an event (or agreeing to do 
so)—without more—does not fit that definition of ‘official 
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This means that a properly instructed jury on remand, 
presented with evidence of Fattah’s efforts to secure an 
ambassadorship for Vederman and evidence of the Zionts 
hiring, could find more than a single official act. 
F. Blue Guardians 
In addition to the charges arising from his dealings 
with Vederman, Fattah was charged in Count 3 with 
                                              
act.’ ”). The relevant question for a jury to consider on 
remand, then, is whether these actions constituted “a 
‘decision or action’ on a different question or matter”—to 
wit, the formal appointment of an ambassador. Id. at 2369 
(emphasis omitted). 
Even though the emails, letters, and phone call are 
not, individually, official acts, it will be for a jury to decide 
if Fattah’s efforts to secure an ambassadorship for 
Vederman crossed the line from permissible “support” to 
impermissible “pressure or advice.” While we express 
doubt that some of Fattah’s efforts concerning the 
ambassadorship are, when considered in isolation, enough 
to cross that line, a properly instructed jury considering all 
of the facts in context might nonetheless conclude that 
other efforts—such as a hand-delivered letter to the 
President of the United States—indeed crossed that line. 
Further, a jury might find that in the aggregate, three 
emails, two letters, and a phone call crossed the line and 
therefore constituted a “decision or action” on the 
identified matter of appointment. 
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participating in a scheme with Lindenfeld to funnel money 
to a fraudulent nonprofit organization. In connection with 
this scheme, Fattah was convicted of conspiring to commit 
honest services fraud. 
Fattah owed Lindenfeld nearly $100,000 for work 
performed on Fattah’s 2007 mayoral campaign. In lieu of 
repayment, Fattah suggested that Lindenfeld create an 
entity, later named Blue Guardians, to which Fattah would 
direct $15,000,000 in public funds by using his position as 
a member of the House Committee on Appropriations. 
Nothing in McDonnell requires us to upset Fattah’s 
conviction on Count 3. 
Step 1(A) of our McDonnell analysis requires the 
Government to “identify a ‘question, matter, cause, suit, 
proceeding or controversy.’ ” 136 S. Ct. at 2368. Here, the 
“matter” is the appropriation of millions of dollars in 
public funds. See Repak, 852 F.3d at 253–54 (holding the 
awarding of redevelopment funds to be an official act). In 
particular, it was Fattah’s promise to perform this official 
act that was unlawful. As McDonnell makes clear: 
[A] public official is not required to actually 
make a decision or take an action on a 
“question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or 
controversy”; it is enough that the official 
agree to do so. The agreement need not be 
explicit, and the public official need not 
specify the means that he will use to perform 
his end of the bargain. 
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136 S. Ct. at 2370–71 (internal citations omitted). That 
Fattah took steps to actually carry out his promise (e.g., by 
drafting and sending a formal appropriations request on 
official congressional letterhead) is evidence of his illegal 
promise. See id. at 2371. 
Step 1(B) requires the Government to establish that 
the “ ‘question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or 
controversy’ . . . ‘may at any time be pending’ or ‘may by 
law be brought’ before a public official.” McDonnell, 136 
S. Ct. at 2368. Appropriating public funds was not only a 
matter that was pending before Fattah as a member of the 
Appropriations Committee, it was also a matter that was 
pending before the Chairman and Ranking Member of an 
Appropriations Subcommittee to whom Fattah ultimately 
sent a formal written request. See id. at 2369 (“[T]he 
matter may be pending either before the public official 
who is performing the official act, or before another public 
official.”). Appropriating millions of dollars in response to 
the Blue Guardians request is “focused and concrete,” and 
“the kind of thing that can be put on an agenda, tracked for 
progress, and then checked off as complete.” Id. 
Given Fattah’s membership on the Appropriations 
Committee, this was “something within the specific duties 
of an official’s position—the function conferred by the 
authority of his office.” Id. Even if we were to assume, 
against all reason, that an appropriation is not “something 
within the specific duties” of either Fattah or the Chairman 
or Ranking Member of an Appropriations Subcommittee, 
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Fattah’s formal request for an appropriation was 
something that Fattah had the authority to do. Like the 
Executive Director in Repak, who lacked authority himself 
to award redevelopment funds but could request such 
funds from the Board, Fattah used his position as a 
Congressman to formally request appropriations for the 
Blue Guardians. 852 F.3d at 254 (“Repak had the power 
to, and indeed did, make recommendations to the 
[redevelopment authority. 
Step 2 of McDonnell requires the Government to 
“prove that the public official made a decision or took an 
action ‘on’ that question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding, 
or controversy, or agreed to do so.” 136 S. Ct. at 2368 
(emphasis added). Here, Fattah agreed to request an 
appropriation for a bogus purpose. Unlike Fattah’s letters, 
emails, and phone call seeking an ambassadorship for 
Vederman, there is no potential for the jury to have made 
a mistake when it found Fattah’s Blue Guardians promise 
unlawful. 
Fattah argues that the Government presented “[n]o 
evidence . . . that would have allowed [the jury] to 
conclude that [he] made a decision or took an action, or 
could have done so, on the question whether Blue 
Guardians would receive a $15 million federal grant.” 
Fattah Br. 46. This argument misses the point. It was 
Fattah’s agreement to engage in the official act of formally 
requesting the appropriation that was illegal. See 
McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2371. 
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Lindenfeld’s trial testimony provided sufficient 
evidence of Fattah’s illegal agreement. JA1694–96, 1954. 
Fattah’s letter provided additional evidence from which 
the jury could have concluded that Fattah illegally agreed 
to perform an official act.18 In short, the agreement itself 
was illegal, and the Government provided sufficient 
evidence for the jury to conclude that the illegal agreement 
took place. 
The Government’s evidence in support of the Blue 
Guardians scheme meets the requirements of McDonnell, 
and the Count 3 verdict will stand. 
V. Sufficiency of the Evidence for the RICO 
Conspiracy Conviction 
The jury found Fattah, Vederman, Brand, and 
Nicholas guilty of the RICO conspiracy charged in Count 
1 of the indictment, but acquitted Bowser. Vederman filed 
a post-verdict motion, and the District Court overturned 
his RICO conspiracy conviction. 
                                              
18 Despite Fattah’s protestation to the contrary, there is 
evidence that Fattah took steps to carry out his official act. 
JA6432–33 (Letter from Congressman Fattah to House 
Appropriations Subcommittee members “request[ing] 
funding and support for the following projects and 
programs of critical importance,” including $3,000,000 
for “Blue Guardians”). 
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On appeal, Fattah, Brand, and Nicholas challenge 
the sufficiency of the evidence supporting their RICO 
conspiracy convictions. We “review[] the sufficiency of 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the government 
and must credit all available inferences in favor of the 
government.” United States v. Riddick, 156 F.3d 505, 509 
(3d Cir. 1998). If a rational juror could have found the 
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, we must 
sustain the verdict. United States v. Cartwright, 359 F.3d 
281, 286 (3d Cir. 2004), abrogated on other grounds by 
United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418 (3d 
Cir. 2013) (en banc). 
The indictment charged a RICO conspiracy in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), which makes it 
“unlawful for any person to conspire to violate” § 1962(c). 
Section 1962(c) provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person . . . 
associated with any enterprise engaged in, or 
the activities of which affect, interstate . . . 
commerce, to conduct or participate, directly 
or indirectly, in the conduct of such 
enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of 
racketeering activity . . . . 
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). 
In Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52 (1997), the 
defendant was convicted of a § 1962(d) RICO conspiracy, 
but a jury acquitted him of the substantive RICO offense 
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under § 1962(c). Id. at 55. The Supreme Court rejected 
Salinas’s contention that his conviction had to be set aside 
because he had neither committed nor agreed to commit 
the two predicate acts required for the § 1962(c) offense. 
Id. at 66. The Court declared that liability for a RICO 
conspiracy under § 1962(d), “unlike the general 
conspiracy provision applicable to federal crimes,” does 
not require proof of an overt act. Id. at 63. A conspiracy 
may be found, the Court explained, “even if a conspirator 
does not agree to commit or facilitate each and every part 
of the substantive offense. The partners in the criminal 
plan must agree to pursue the same criminal objective and 
may divide up the work, yet each is responsible for the acts 
of each other.” Id. at 63–64 (citations omitted). This means 
that, if a plan “calls for some conspirators to perpetrate the 
crime and others to provide support, the supporters are as 
guilty as the perpetrators.” Id. at 64. Thus, opting into and 
participating in a conspiracy may result in criminal 
liability for the acts of one’s co-conspirators. Smith v. 
Berg, 247 F.3d 532, 537 (3d Cir. 2001). 
Accordingly, liability for a RICO conspiracy may 
be found where the conspirator intended to “further an 
endeavor which, if completed, would satisfy all of the 
elements of a substantive criminal offense, but it suffices 
that he adopt the goal of furthering or facilitating the 
criminal endeavor.” Salinas, 522 U.S. at 65. Because the 
substantive criminal offense here was conducting a 
§ 1962(c) enterprise, the government had to prove: 
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(1) that two or more persons agreed to 
conduct or to participate, directly or 
indirectly, in the conduct of an enterprise’s 
affairs through a pattern of racketeering 
activity; (2) that the defendant was a party to 
or member of that agreement; and (3) that the 
defendant joined the agreement or conspiracy 
knowing of its objective to conduct or 
participate, directly or indirectly, in the 
conduct of an enterprise’s affairs through a 
pattern of racketeering activity. 
United States v. John-Baptiste, 747 F.3d 186, 207 (3d Cir. 
2014). 
In United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981), 
the Supreme Court instructed that an enterprise is a “group 
of persons associated together for a common purpose of 
engaging in a course of conduct.” Id. at 583. The 
government can prove an enterprise “by evidence of an 
ongoing organization, formal or informal, and by evidence 
that the various associates function as a continuing unit.” 
Id. In Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938 (2009), the 
Supreme Court established that an “association-in-fact 
enterprise must have at least three structural features: a 
purpose, relationships among those associated with the 
enterprise, and longevity sufficient to permit these 
associates to pursue the enterprise’s purpose.” Id. at 946. 
The structure necessary for a § 1962(c) enterprise is not 
complex. Boyle explained that an enterprise 
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need not have a hierarchical structure or a 
“chain of command”; decisions may be made 
on an ad hoc basis and by any number of 
methods—by majority vote, consensus, a 
show of strength, etc. Members of the group 
need not have fixed roles; different members 
may perform different roles at different 
times. The group need not have a name, 
regular meetings, dues, [or] established rules 
and regulations . . . .While the group must 
function as a continuing unit and remain in 
existence long enough to pursue a course of 
conduct, nothing in RICO exempts an 
enterprise whose associates engage in spurts 
of activity punctuated by periods of 
quiescence. 
Id. at 948. 
Another element of a substantive § 1962(c) RICO 
enterprise is that the enterprise must conduct its affairs 
through a pattern of racketeering activity. Section 1961 
defines racketeering activity to include various criminal 
offenses, including wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1344, and 
obstruction of justice, 18 U.S.C. § 1511. See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1961(1). A pattern of such activity “requires at least two 
acts of racketeering activity.” Id. § 1961(5). The 
racketeering predicates may establish a pattern if they 
“related and . . . amounted to, or threatened the likelihood 
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of, continued criminal activity.” H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. 
Co., 492 U.S. 229, 237 (1989). 
Here, the District Court denied the post-trial 
sufficiency arguments raised by Fattah, Brand, and 
Nicholas. It reasoned: 
For a RICO conspiracy to exist, the 
conspirators must agree to participate in an 
enterprise with a unity of purpose as well as 
relationships among those involved. The 
evidence demonstrates that an agreement 
among Fattah, Brand, Nicholas, Lindenfeld, 
and Naylor existed for the overall purpose of 
maintaining and enhancing Fattah as a 
political figure and of preventing his standing 
from being weakened by the failure to be able 
to pay or write down his campaign debts. 
These five persons agreed to work together as 
a continuing unit, albeit with different roles. 
The Government established that 
Fattah, Brand, and Nicholas conspired along 
with Naylor and Lindenfeld to conceal and 
repay the 2007 illegal $1,000,000 loan to the 
Fattah for Mayor campaign. 
JA128–29. The District Court further determined that 
[w]hile each member may not have been 
involved in every aspect of the enterprise, its 
activities were sufficiently structured and 
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coordinated to achieve the purpose of 
maintaining and enhancing Fattah’s political 
standing and of preventing him from being 
weakened politically because of his 
campaign debts. 
A RICO conspiracy also requires an 
agreement to participate in an enterprise with 
longevity sufficient to pursue its purpose. 
This was established. In May 2007 the illegal 
loan was obtained and continued through its 
repayment in January 2008 and into at least 
2014 when the last campaign report reducing 
a fake campaign debt to Naylor’s consulting 
firm was filed by Fattah. 
JA131. 
The defendants argue that the evidence is 
insufficient to show either an enterprise for purposes of 
§ 1962(c) or an agreement as required for a § 1962(d) 
conspiracy. We disagree, and conclude that the District 
Court’s analysis is on the mark. 
We begin by considering whether there was an 
agreement. The evidence showed that Fattah knew each 
member involved in the scheme to conceal the unlawful 
campaign loan. When Lindenfeld learned of the $1 million 
loan, he informed Fattah that it exceeded campaign 
finance limits. In short, the transaction was unlawful, and 
the two knew it. The transaction nonetheless went 
forward, disguised as a loan, with Lindenfeld executing 
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the promissory note as Strategies’ officer and obligating 
Strategies to repay Lord $1 million. The concealment 
efforts continued as Lindenfeld funneled a substantial 
portion of the loan proceeds to Naylor for get-out-the-vote 
efforts. After the losing campaign, Lindenfeld spoke with 
Fattah and Naylor about accounting for the funds that had 
been spent. They decided not to include the amounts in the 
FFM campaign reports. Fattah instructed Naylor to 
prepare a fictitious invoice, and Naylor complied. The 
FFM campaign reports filed from 2008 to 2014 disclosed 
nothing about the unlawful $1 million loan. Instead, they 
falsely showed that Naylor’s consulting firm made yearly 
in-kind contributions of $20,000 in debt forgiveness, when 
in reality there was no debt to forgive. 
As Lindenfeld fretted over repaying the $600,000 
balance of the Lord loan, Naylor assured him that Fattah 
had promised to take care of the repayment. And the 
evidence supports an inference that Fattah recruited both 
Nicholas and Brand in doing so. As EAA’s director, 
Nicholas could fund the repayment. Brand, through his 
company, Solutions, acted as the middleman: he received 
the payment from EAA pursuant to a fictitious contract, 
and then forwarded the balance due to Strategies pursuant 
to yet another fictitious contract. Nicholas and Brand 
continued in the spring and summer of 2008 to hide the 
fictitious agreement and the $600,000 payment to 
Lindenfeld to satisfy the Lord loan. 
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In short, this evidence shows that Fattah, 
Lindenfeld, Naylor, Brand, and Nicholas all agreed to 
participate in Fattah’s plan to conceal the unlawful 
campaign loan to maintain his political stature. Nicholas 
and Brand claim that they had no knowledge of the false 
campaign reporting aspect of the plan. But as Salinas 
instructs, conspirators need not “agree to commit or 
facilitate each and every part of the” conspiracy. 522 U.S. 
at 63. Rather, they “must agree to pursue the same criminal 
objective and may divide up the work, yet each [be] 
responsible for the acts of each other.” Id. at 63–64. Thus, 
a conspirator may agree to “facilitate only some of the acts 
leading to the substantive offense” yet still be criminally 
liable. Id. at 65. 
The evidence showed that a substantial amount of 
money was needed to repay Lord, and that the source of 
the repayment was EAA, a non-profit organization whose 
funds could be spent only for purposes consistent with the 
terms of the grants it received. It also showed that Nicholas 
was presented with a sham contract to legitimize the 
EAA–Solutions transaction. We conclude that the 
evidence is sufficient to support an inference that Nicholas 
knew at the start that the plan was unlawful. Yet she still 
agreed to provide the requisite funds and to play a role in 
concealing the illegal campaign loan so that Fattah could 
maintain his political stature. 
As to Brand, even if he did not know that false 
campaign reports were being filed, the evidence is 
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sufficient to show he played a key role in the enterprise. 
From the outset, Brand worked to disguise the repayment 
of the Lord loan as the consideration in a sham contract 
between EAA and Solutions. He then arranged for the 
transfer of funds to Strategies in satisfaction of a 
contractual term in another purported business agreement 
between Solutions and Strategies. The evidence reveals 
that Brand was the point man in the effort to meet the 
January 31, 2008 deadline to repay the Lord loan, and it 
amply shows that Brand also agreed to participate in the 
plan to hide the illegal campaign loan and its repayment to 
benefit Fattah politically. 
Fattah, Brand, and Nicholas attack their RICO 
conspiracy convictions on another front. They argue that 
those verdicts should be set aside because the evidence 
fails to show that the various schemes alleged in the 
indictment as part of the RICO conspiracy are connected. 
The RICO count, they assert, charges a hub-and-spoke 
conspiracy that is unconnected by a rim. In their view, 
Fattah is the hub, and the spokes consist of a series of 
independent schemes: the Vederman bribery scheme, the 
payment of the outstanding tuition debt of Fattah’s son 
Chip, the Blue Guardians plan, and the repayment of the 
illegal Lord loan to maintain Fattah’s political stature. 
They argue that, without a unifying rim, their actions 
cannot constitute an enterprise. Again, we disagree. 
In In re Insurance Brokerage Antitrust Litigation, 
618 F.3d 300 (3d Cir. 2010), we concluded, in analyzing 
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one of plaintiffs’ RICO claims, that the alleged hub-and-
spoke enterprise—comprised of broker hubs and insurer 
spokes—could not withstand a motion to dismiss because 
it did not have a unifying rim. Id. at 374. We explained 
that the allegations did “not plausibly imply concerted 
action—as opposed to merely parallel conduct—by the 
insurers, and therefore cannot provide a ‘rim’ enclosing 
the ‘spokes’ of these alleged ‘hub-and-spoke’ 
enterprises.” Id. Thus, the allegations did not “adequately 
plead an association-in-fact enterprise” because the hub-
and-spoke conspiracy failed to “function as a unit.” Id. 
That is not the case here. The evidence showed that 
Fattah, Brand, and Nicholas agreed to conceal the illegal 
Lord loan. Each acted for the common purpose of 
furthering Fattah’s political interests. In short, they 
engaged in concerted activity and functioned as a unit. The 
jury convicted Fattah, Brand, and Nicholas of the RICO 
conspiracy based on the racketeering activity of wire fraud 
and obstruction of justice to conceal the unlawful 
transaction. Because the evidence shows that Fattah, 
Lindenfeld, Naylor, Brand, and Nicholas agreed to protect 
Fattah’s political status by acting to maintain the secrecy 
of the unlawful Lord loan, the alleged lack of a unifying 
“rim” is not fatal to this RICO enterprise. What matters in 
analyzing the structure of this enterprise is that it 
functioned as a unit. Boyle, 556 U.S. at 945; In re Ins. 
Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d at 374. That “basic 
requirement” was met. Id. 
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We turn next to the contention that the evidence 
fails to establish other components of an enterprise. We 
conclude that much of the evidence supporting the 
existence of an agreement also shows that there was an 
association-in-fact enterprise. 
Boyle made clear that an association-in-fact 
enterprise must have “a purpose, relationships among 
those associated with the enterprise, and longevity 
sufficient to permit these associates to pursue the 
enterprise’s purpose.” 556 U.S. at 946. The purpose, as we 
have repeatedly observed, was to maintain and preserve 
Fattah’s political stature by concealing the illegal loan and 
its repayment. Though informal, there were relationships 
among those associated with the enterprise. Fattah was at 
the center of this association and he directed its activity. 
He knew each of the association’s members, and the 
members knew each other (except, perhaps, for Nicholas, 
who may not have known Lindenfeld).19 
                                              
19 Nicholas’s lack of familiarity with Lindenfeld does not 
undermine her membership in this association-in-fact 
enterprise. We have previously explained that “[i]t is well-
established that one conspirator need not know the 
identities of all his co-conspirators, nor be aware of all the 
details of the conspiracy in order to be found to have 
agreed to participate in it.” United States v. Riccobene, 709 
F.2d 214, 225 (3d Cir. 1983), abrogated on other grounds 
by Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46 (1991). 
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The Government also adduced sufficient proof of 
the longevity component required for an enterprise. The 
scheme began in mid-2007, when Lord made the 
campaign loan, directing the proceeds of the loan to 
Strategies. From the outset, Fattah, Lindenfeld, and Naylor 
all knew they needed to conceal this illegal transaction. 
They began by fabricating an explanation for the source of 
the funds they spent on election day. SLA created a fake 
invoice for the campaign, showing a fictitious debt that 
Naylor could later forgive by fictitious in-kind 
contributions existing only on Fattah’s campaign finance 
reports. 
The effort to disguise the Lord loan was not limited 
to filing false campaign reports. Nicholas and Brand, who 
joined the conspiracy a few months later than the other 
members, understood that they too had to make the 
fraudulent $600,000 payment by EAA to Solutions appear 
legitimate. Nicholas and Brand tried to disguise the sham 
contract as an ordinary transaction (even though it called 
for a six-figure upfront payment simply to support 
Solutions’ various projects), and they succeeded in 
keeping it out of the DOJ auditors’ view until August 
2008. The ruse continued as Solutions funneled the 
$600,000 payment to Strategies under the guise of another 
sham contract (which also required an upfront six-figure 
payment). The scheme then continued as Fattah submitted 
false FFM campaign reports from 2008 through 2014. 
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Finally, we consider whether the enterprise 
conducted its affairs through a pattern of racketeering 
activity, as required for a § 1962(c) enterprise. Wire fraud 
and obstruction of justice may constitute “racketeering 
activity” under § 1961(1). As the Supreme Court 
instructed in H.J. Inc., the “multiple predicates within a 
single scheme” must be related and “amount[] to, or 
threaten[] the likelihood of, continued criminal activity.” 
492 U.S. at 237. Here, the amount of the illegal loan to be 
concealed was substantial. The enterprise needed to write 
off the fictitious debt to Naylor’s consulting firm, and it 
was urgent that both the EAA–Solutions contract and the 
Solutions–Strategies contract be legitimized. We conclude 
the evidence was sufficient to establish that this enterprise 
conducted its affairs through a pattern of racketeering 
activity and that the predicate acts of wire fraud and 
obstruction of justice were related. The racketeering 
activity furthered the goals of maintaining the secrecy of 
this $1 million illicit campaign loan and of preserving 
Fattah’s political stature. 
Nicholas contends that the evidence fails to 
establish a pattern of racketeering activity because the 
actions to which she agreed did not “extend[] over a 
substantial period of time” as H.J. Inc. requires. 492 U.S. 
at 242. That case indeed instructs that the continuity 
requirement of a pattern is a “temporal concept,” and that 
“[p]redicate acts extending over a few weeks or months” 
do not satisfy the continuity concept. Id. But the Supreme 
Court explained that continuity may also be established by 
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showing that there is a “threat of continued racketeering 
activity.” Id. Here, the course of fraudulent conduct 
undertaken to secure and to conceal the $1 million Lord 
loan consisted of the creation of sham debts, fictitious 
contracts, and false accounting entries over the course of 
about a year. But because Fattah needed to appear able to 
retire his campaign debt, the enterprise needed to continue 
filing false campaign reports for several years, allowing 
the annual $20,000 in-kind debt forgiveness contributions 
to appear to satisfy Naylor’s fake $193,000 invoice. That 
evidence was sufficient to establish the requisite threat of 
continued criminal activity. See H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 242–
43. 
We conclude that the Government met its burden in 
proving that Fattah, Brand, and Nicholas20 engaged in a 
RICO conspiracy in violation of § 1962(d). 
                                              
20 Nicholas also asserts, in passing, that that her conviction 
under § 1962(d) should be set aside because that statutory 
provision is unconstitutionally vague as applied to her. 
According to Nicholas, a person of ordinary intelligence 
would not know that her actions constituted an agreement 
to participate in a RICO enterprise. See United States v. 
Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1104–05 (3d Cir. 1990). To the 
contrary, a person of ordinary intelligence, who had been 
employed by a prominent politician and then became the 
CEO of a nonprofit organization which that politician had 
founded (and, to some extent, continued to direct), would 
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VI. Variance from the Indictment and Sufficiency of 
the Evidence for Count 2 
Brand and Nicholas challenge their convictions for 
conspiracy to commit wire fraud by arguing that the 
Government’s evidence at trial impermissibly varied from 
the indictment. Nicholas also challenges the sufficiency of 
the evidence to support her conviction for conspiracy to 
commit wire fraud. We address these contentions 
together.21 
Count 2 of the indictment alleged a single 
conspiracy. JA277–79. Brand and Nicholas assert that the 
Government’s evidence at trial did not support the 
existence of a single conspiracy but instead showed two 
independent conspiracies, only one of which involved the 
two of them. According to Brand and Nicholas, the only 
conspiracy with which they were involved ended more 
than five years before the Government charged them. That 
would mean that all their conduct falls outside the five-
year limitations period for wire fraud conspiracy under 18 
U.S.C. § 3282. 
                                              
realize that agreeing to participate with others in hiding an 
unlawful campaign loan of $1 million could constitute an 
unlawful RICO conspiracy. 
21 In her briefing, Nicholas discusses variance in far less 
detail than Brand, so we refer primarily to Brand’s 
arguments. See Nicholas Br. 54–56. Her variance 
arguments fail for the same reasons that Brand’s fail. 
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“A conviction must be vacated when (1) there is a 
variance between the indictment and the proof presented 
at trial and (2) the variance prejudices a substantial right 
of the defendant.” Kemp, 500 F.3d at 287 (quoting United 
States v. Kelly, 892 F.2d 255, 258 (3d Cir. 1989)). We see 
no variance, and will affirm the District Court. 
A variance exists “if the indictment charges a single 
conspiracy while the evidence presented at trial proves 
only the existence of multiple conspiracies.” Id. “We must 
determine ‘whether there was sufficient evidence from 
which the jury could have concluded that the government 
proved the single conspiracy alleged in the indictment.’ ” 
Id. (quoting Kelly, 892 F.2d at 258). Viewing the record in 
the light most favorable to the Government, we consider 
three factors: (1) “whether there was a common goal 
among the conspirators”; (2) “whether the agreement 
contemplated bringing to pass a continuous result that will 
not continue without the continuous cooperation of the 
conspirators”; and (3) “the extent to which the participants 
overlap in the various dealings.” Id. (quoting Kelly, 892 
F.2d at 259). 
Brand argues that the Government failed to 
establish a common goal among the conspirators. To 
determine whether the conspirators shared a common 
goal, “we look to the underlying purpose of the alleged 
criminal activity” in a fairly broad sense. United States v. 
Rigas, 605 F.3d 194, 214 (3d Cir. 2010) (en banc). In 
Rigas, we described the common goal of the defendants as 
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“enriching [themselves] through the plunder of [their 
corporate employer],” id., and we have similarly 
articulated the common goal in fairly general terms 
elsewhere. See United States v. Greenidge, 495 F.3d 85, 
93 (3d Cir. 2007) (“There was certainly evidence of a 
common goal among these co-conspirators: to make 
money by depositing stolen and altered corporate checks 
into business accounts.”); Kelly, 892 F.2d at 259 (“[T]he 
common goal of all the participants was simply to make 
money selling ‘speed.’ ”). Importantly, a common goal 
may exist even when “conspirators individually or in 
groups perform different tasks in pursuing the common 
goal,” and a single conspiracy may “attract[] different 
members at different times” or “involve[] different sub-
groups committing acts in furtherance of the overall plan.” 
United States v. Boyd, 595 F.2d 120, 123 (3d Cir. 1978). 
Here, the indictment described the purpose of the 
unified conspiracy in Count 2 at length: 
It was a purpose of the conspiracy to obtain 
an illegal campaign loan and to fraudulently 
repay that loan with hundreds of thousands of 
dollars of misappropriated charitable funds 
from Sallie Mae and federal grant funds from 
NASA which were intended for educational 
purposes. 
. . . . It was further a purpose of the 
conspiracy to present FATTAH to the public 
as a perennially viable candidate for public 
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office who honored his obligations to his 
creditors and was able to retire his publicly 
reported campaign debts. 
. . . . It was further a purpose of the 
conspiracy to promote FATTAH’s political 
and financial goals through deception by 
concealing and protecting the conspirators’ 
activities from detection and prosecution by 
law enforcement officials and the federal 
judiciary, as well as from exposure by the 
news media, through means that included 
obstruction of justice and the falsification of 
documents, including Campaign Finance 
Reports, false invoices, contracts, and other 
documents and records. 
JA277–78, ¶¶ 3–5. 
Brand characterizes the evidence at trial as 
establishing two distinct conspiracies. The first he labels 
the “diversion of funds scheme,” covering the 
misappropriation of funds by Nicholas, Brand, 
Lindenfeld, and Fattah to repay the Lord loan. Brand Br. 
34. Brand calls the second conspiracy the “CFR scheme,” 
in which Fattah and Naylor filed the false campaign 
finance reports showing Naylor gradually forgiving a non-
existent debt. Id. 
Brand argues that the only goal of the CFR scheme 
was to cover up how the funds from the illegal campaign 
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loan were spent, a goal he distinguishes from that of the 
diversion of funds scheme, which he characterizes as a 
plan to cover up the repayment of the loan with stolen 
funds. He also argues that the evidence does not establish 
he was involved in, or even aware of, the false campaign 
finance reports filed by Fattah. In Brand’s view, that 
necessarily means the evidence showed two separate 
conspiracies. 
In considering these arguments, we begin by noting 
that one conspiracy can involve multiple subsidiary 
schemes. Rigas, 605 F.3d at 214. It is true that the false 
campaign finance reports, in the narrowest sense, had the 
specific purpose of covering up how the illegal loan funds 
were used during the election. But the false campaign 
finance reports were also filed in furtherance of a broader 
goal shared by the conspirators involved in repayment of 
the Lord loan. They sought to promote Fattah’s political 
and financial goals by preserving his image as a viable 
candidate and making him appear able to repay or 
otherwise service his campaign debts without resorting to 
illegal means in doing so. The two subsidiary schemes 
worked in concert in furtherance of this overarching goal, 
and both were directed at covering up how the loan was 
truly repaid. The “diversion of funds scheme” hid the 
illegal (but real) loan repayment through the use of fake 
contracts; the “CFR scheme” showed the seemingly legal 
(but fake) loan forgiveness installments through the 
creation of fake invoices and campaign finance reports. 
The existence of two concealment schemes acting in 
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concert does not undermine the unity of the conspiracy of 
which they were both a part. We have no difficulty 
concluding that the false campaign finance reports and the 
concealed use of stolen funds to repay the Lord loan 
operated together in furtherance of a common goal. 
As for Brand’s argument that he was unaware of the 
false campaign finance reports and therefore could not be 
a part of any conspiracy involving them, it is well-settled 
that “each member of the charged conspiracy is liable for 
the substantive crimes his coconspirators commit in 
furtherance of the conspiracy even if he neither 
participates in his co-conspirators’ crimes nor has any 
knowledge of them.” United States v. Bailey, 840 F.3d 99, 
112 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Pinkerton v. United States, 328 
U.S. 640 (1946)). The exceptions to that rule allow a 
defendant to escape liability for a co-conspirator’s crime 
if: (1) “the substantive offense committed by one of the 
conspirators was not in fact done in furtherance of the 
conspiracy,” (2) “the substantive offense committed by 
one of the conspirators ‘did not fall within the scope of the 
unlawful project,’ ” or (3) “the substantive offense 
committed by one of the conspirators ‘could not be 
reasonably foreseen as a necessary or natural consequence 
of the unlawful agreement.’ ” Id. (quoting Pinkerton, 328 
U.S. at 647–48). There was, as we have concluded, a unity 
of purpose between the co-conspirators to further Fattah’s 
political and financial goals by secretly obtaining and 
repaying an illegal campaign loan with stolen funds. The 
filing of false campaign reports does not fit within any of 
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the recognized exceptions to co-conspirator liability, as it 
was in furtherance of the conspiracy’s shared goal, within 
the scope of the agreement to conceal the loan, and 
foreseeable to Brand and Nicholas. 
Neither Brand nor Nicholas briefed the other two 
factors we consider when determining whether the 
evidence impermissibly varied from the evidence, 
“whether the agreement contemplated bringing to pass a 
continuous result that will not continue without the 
continuous cooperation of the conspirators,” and “the 
extent to which the participants overlap in the various 
dealings.” Kemp, 500 F.3d at 287 (quoting Kelly, 892 F.2d 
at 258). The unified goal of promoting Fattah’s political 
career and maintaining secrecy surrounding the illegal 
loan and the misappropriated funds used to repay it 
required the continuous cooperation of the conspirators. 
Indeed, the efforts of several of them overlapped in every 
aspect of the scheme. And Lindenfeld and Fattah were, at 
a minimum, involved in some way in nearly every aspect 
of the origination of the loan, the false campaign finance 
reports, and the use of misappropriated funds to repay the 
loan. For his part, Naylor was involved in the use of the 
funds, the false campaign finance reports, and to a lesser 
extent, the repayment of the loan. 
Brand (as part of his variance argument) and 
Nicholas (as part of her sufficiency argument) argue that 
the Government did not prove they agreed to conceal their 
actions, and thus the false campaign reports would not be 
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sufficient to extend the duration of the conspiracy so that 
it fell within the statute of limitations. Acts of 
concealment, such as the false campaign reports, are not 
automatically “in furtherance” of a conspiracy. We must 
determine whether there was “an express original 
agreement among the conspirators to continue to act in 
concert in order to cover up, for their own self-protection, 
traces of the crime after its commission,” as opposed to “a 
conspiracy to conceal . . . being implied from elements 
which will be present in virtually every conspiracy case, 
that is, secrecy plus overt acts of concealment.” 
Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 404 (1957). If 
the indictment “specifically alleges a continuing 
conspiracy” to conceal the crime after the completion of 
the wire fraud, and such a conspiracy can be proven, the 
statute of limitations does not begin to run until the last 
overt act of concealment. United States v. Moses, 148 F.3d 
277, 282 (3d Cir. 1998). 
Here, the evidence shows that the conspirators 
expressly agreed to conceal the loan and its repayment. As 
an initial matter, Brand’s only role in the conspiracy was 
to cover up the use of stolen funds by (1) serving as an 
intermediary between Nicholas and Lindenfeld; and 
(2) agreeing to create false documentation (the contracts) 
with both EAA and Strategies for the sole purpose of 
disguising the payments and covering up the wire fraud 
conspiracy. Nicholas could simply have paid Lindenfeld 
herself (or paid Lord) if she and Brand had not agreed to 
conceal the crime from the start. Additionally, and as 
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Brand acknowledges, the false campaign finance reports 
began before the loan was repaid, proving that 
concealment of the crime was contemplated and begun as 
a direct purpose of the conspiracy before Brand and 
Nicholas became involved in the repayment. Nicholas too 
agreed to conceal the repayment, as she implicitly 
acknowledged in her emails with Brand and Fattah. GSA2. 
Finally, when Lindenfeld briefly strayed from the 
conspiracy’s commitment to secrecy by mentioning the 
repayment in front of others who did not know of the 
scheme, Brand became “angry,” “took [Lindenfeld] out in 
the hallway,” and chastised him, saying that “[Lindenfeld] 
couldn’t say that sort of []thing” in front of other people. 
JA1670–71. We conclude that the evidence is consistent 
with the allegations in the indictment, which charge a 
single conspiracy consisting of an original agreement to 
conceal the illegal loan and its subsequent illegal 
repayment to further Fattah’s political career. 
Nicholas makes several arguments in passing. She 
suggests that the District Court upheld the conviction after 
trial “on a theory not submitted to the jury.” Nicholas Br. 
51. This argument is, essentially, that the indictment and 
the District Court’s post-trial ruling described the 
conspiracy one way, but that the jury charge described the 
conspiracy differently. Nicholas argues that the jury was 
presented with the theory that the sole purpose of the false 
campaign reports under Count 2 was to “conceal[] the 
alleged scheme to defraud,” JA5849, rather than to support 
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Fattah’s political career, as the District Court described the 
purpose after trial, see JA74. 
Nicholas ignores that part of the jury charge which 
instructed that Count 2 required a finding “[t]hat two or 
more persons agreed to commit wire fraud as charged in 
the indictment.” JA5845 (emphasis added). The jury had 
access to the indictment, and as Nicholas points out, 
Nicholas Br. 45–46, the indictment outlines the offense in 
the same way the District Court later described it in its 
post-trial ruling. The District Court consistently described 
the count, and we see no reversible error. 
Nicholas also argues that the conspiracy charged in 
Count 2 has an objective—“to ‘present Fattah’ as 
‘perennially viable’ ”—and that such an objective is not 
illegal. Nicholas Br. 53. But, of course, the jury was not 
instructed that it was illegal to be a Fattah supporter, or 
even to work on his campaign. The jury was charged 
specifically on the crime of wire fraud. 
We conclude that there was no impermissible 
variance between the indictment and the Government’s 
evidence at trial, and that there was sufficient evidence to 
support the convictions. We will affirm the convictions of 
Brand and Nicholas for conspiracy to commit wire fraud 
under Count 2. 
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VII. The District Court’s Instruction to the Jury on 
the Meaning of Intent 
Nicholas contends that the District Court 
improperly instructed the jury by using the disjunctive 
rather than the conjunctive at one point in its definition of 
intent. When providing its final charge to the jury, the 
District Court explained: 
Certain of the offenses charged in the 
indictment require that the government prove 
that the charged defendant acted intentionally 
or with intent. This means that the 
government must prove either that (1), it was 
the defendant’s conscious desire or purpose 
to act in a certain way or to cause a certain 
result; or (2), the defendant knew that he or 
she was acting in that way or it would be 
practically certain to cause that result. 
JA5787 (emphasis added). According to Nicholas, an 
accurate definition of intent required that the final “or” be 
an “and.” Nicholas argues that this was an error so 
grievous as to “effectively eliminate[] the intent element 
from each offense of conviction.”22 Nicholas Br. 26. 
                                              
22 The Comment to Third Circuit Model Criminal Jury 
Instruction 5.03 makes clear that the definition of intent 
encapsulates both “specific intent” (acting “purposely” or 
with “conscious object”) and “general intent” (acting 
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Our review of whether a jury instruction stated the 
proper legal standard is plenary. United States v. Petersen, 
622 F.3d 196, 207 n.7 (3d Cir. 2010). At trial, Nicholas 
failed to object to this portion of the jury charge. 
Accordingly, our review must be for plain error. See 
United States v. Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 253, 258 (3d Cir. 
2014) (en banc). 
To prevail on plain error review, Nicholas must 
establish that there was an error, that it was plain (i.e., clear 
under current law), and that it affected her substantial 
rights (i.e., whether there is a reasonable likelihood that 
the jury applied the challenged instruction in an 
impermissible manner). United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 
                                              
“knowingly” or “with awareness”). Although Nicholas 
describes the alleged error as “essentially eliminating” the 
element of intent, we think Nicholas’s argument is better 
understood as a claim that the instruction given could have 
permitted a jury to conclude that she acted with only 
general intent (that she was aware of what she was doing), 
when her crimes require specific intent (that she had an 
illegal purpose). As her brief states, “[p]lainly she 
‘knowingly’ wrote checks from EAA to [Solutions] and 
made record entries about them; the question was whether 
she intended to defraud EAA and NASA, or to obstruct 
justice, by doing so.” Nicholas Br. 24. We cannot agree 
with her characterization that the instruction resulted in the 
“effective omission” of the intent element from the jury 
instructions. 
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725, 733–34 (1993); United States v. Dobson, 419 F.3d 
231, 239–40 (3d Cir. 2005). If these requirements are met, 
we may then exercise our discretion to address the error, 
but only if we conclude that the error seriously affected the 
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial 
proceeding. United States v. Andrews, 681 F.3d 509, 517 
(3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 
461, 467 (1997)). A failure to instruct the jury on a 
necessary element of an offense ordinarily constitutes 
plain error, unless the instructions as a whole otherwise 
make clear to the jury all the necessary elements of the 
offense. United States v. Stimler, 864 F.3d 253, 270 (3d 
Cir. 2017). 
Nicholas acknowledges, as she must, that the 
instruction given was a verbatim recitation of Instruction 
5.03 of the Third Circuit’s Model Criminal Jury 
Instructions. She nonetheless contends that our Model 
Instruction is erroneous. Even if we were to accept 
Nicholas’s contention that the instruction is incorrect, a 
proposition we consider as highly doubtful, see Petersen, 
622 F.3d at 208 (“We have a hard time concluding that the 
use of our own model jury instruction can constitute error 
. . . .”), we conclude that, considering the instructions as a 
whole, the District Court clearly and specifically 
instructed the jury on the intent element as it applied to 
each of Nicholas’s charged crimes. 
The disputed intent instruction was given at the 
beginning of the final charge, explaining the general 
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meaning of the intent applicable to “[c]ertain of the 
offenses charged.”23 JA5787. The District Court went on 
to instruct the jury in specific detail on the elements of 
each of the crimes of which Nicholas was accused, 
                                              
23 The introductory definition did not end with the 
language Nicholas cites. The District Court elaborated that 
acting in good faith is a complete defense to the charges: 
The offenses charged in the indictment 
require proof that the charged defendants 
acted with criminal intent. If you find that a 
defendant acted in good faith that would be a 
complete defense to such a charge, because 
good faith on the part of the defendant would 
be inconsistent with his or her acting 
knowingly, willfully, corruptly, or with intent 
to defraud or intent to impede, obstruct, or 
wrongfully influence. 
JA5788–89 (emphasis added). This instruction 
undermines Nicholas’s claim that the jury could have 
reasonably concluded that she “ ‘knowingly’ wrote 
checks” but did not “intend[] to defraud . . . or to obstruct 
justice[] by doing so,” Nicholas Br. 24, as this instruction 
leaves little room for doubt that good faith is at odds with 
“criminal intent.” 
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explaining also the intent element of each.24 See JA5791 
(describing the third element of the RICO conspiracy 
charge as: “the particular defendant and at least one other 
alleged conspirator shared a unity of purpose and the intent 
to achieve the objective of conducting or participating in 
the conduct of an enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of 
racketeering activity”); JA5823 (regarding wire fraud, 
instructing that the government must prove “[t]hat the 
defendant under consideration acted with the intent to 
defraud”); JA5838–39 (regarding obstruction of justice, 
instructing that the defendant must have acted “with the 
intent to impair the record, document, or object’s integrity 
or availability for use in an official proceeding,” and must 
have acted corruptly “with the purpose of wrongfully 
impeding the due administration of justice”); JA5860 
(explaining that falsification of records requires that “the 
defendant under consideration acted with the intent to 
impede, obstruct or influence the investigation or proper 
administration of a matter”). These instructions are 
consistent with both our Model Jury Instructions and our 
case law concerning the elements of these crimes. See 
Third Circuit Model Criminal Jury Instruction 6.18.1962D 
(RICO), 6.18.1343 (wire fraud), 6.18.1512A2 (obstruction 
of justice); United States v. Sussman, 709 F.3d 155, 168 
(3d Cir. 2013) (obstruction of justice); United States v. 
                                              
24 Nicholas did not object to the knowledge and intent 
instructions when the District Court discussed each of the 
individual charges, and does not identify a disagreement 
with any specific instruction on any particular charge. 
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Moyer, 674 F.3d 192, 208–09 (3d Cir. 2012) (falsification 
of records); United States v. Pelullo (Pelullo I), 964 F.2d 
193, 216 (3d Cir. 1992) (wire fraud). 
The District Court also provided a separate 
definition of the knowledge element of each charge, 
illustrating the difference between knowledge and intent. 
See JA5793 (explaining that the evidence must show that 
a RICO defendant “knowingly agreed to facilitate or 
further a course of conduct, which if completed would 
include a pattern of racketeering activity”); JA5823 (wire 
fraud means that the defendant “knowingly devised a 
scheme to defraud a victim . . . by materially false or 
fraudulent pretenses”); JA5860 (falsification of records 
has as an element “[t]hat the defendant under 
consideration knowingly concealed, covered up, falsified 
or made false entries in a document or record”). These 
instructions made clear that knowledge and intent are 
separate considerations, undermining Nicholas’s 
contention that the jury was led to believe that “knowledge 
is sufficient to prove intent.” Nicholas Br. 24. 
The District Court provided each member of the 
jury with more than 100 pages of instructions before 
deliberations began. Viewing those instructions as a 
whole, we are satisfied that the jury was apprised of the 
correct meaning of intent as an element of the crimes with 
which Nicholas was charged, as well as the distinction 
between knowledge and intent. We perceive no error, 
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much less error that is plain, in the District Court’s 
instructions to the jury.25 
VIII. Sending the Indictment to the Jury 
At trial, Vederman, Nicholas, and Brand objected to 
the District Court’s decision to give the jury a redacted 
copy of the indictment to use during its deliberations. Only 
Nicholas and Brand raise this issue on appeal. In 
Nicholas’s view, sending the indictment to the jury 
unfairly prejudiced her because it contained unsupported 
allegations that she had obstructed federal agencies and 
referred to a nonexistent certification requirement for 
Sallie Mae funds. Brand argues that he was prejudiced by 
the indictment’s references to “schemes” and “fake” 
contracts, and because it mentioned Brand’s spouse and 
that she was a former member of Fattah’s congressional 
staff. Nicholas and Brand together assert that the 
indictment included legal theories on which the jury was 
not instructed. They contend that the indictment’s 
narrative of the Government’s case set out a roadmap that 
omitted any averments relating to the defense theory and 
allowed the Government to yet again present its case. To 
buttress that argument, Nicholas and Brand cite the 
testimony of Juror 12, who described the jury’s initial 
                                              
25 Accordingly, we need not consider the merits of 
Nicholas’s argument that Model Criminal Jury Instruction 
5.03 is erroneous. 
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deliberations and alleged that the jurors viewed the 
indictment as evidence. 
In United States v. Todaro, 448 F.2d 64, 66 (3d Cir. 
1971), we held that the decision to allow “jurors to have a 
copy of the indictment with them during their 
deliberations . . . is a matter within the discretion of the 
District Judge, subject to a limiting instruction that the 
indictment does not constitute evidence, but is an 
accusation only.” Subsequently, in United States v. 
Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1142 n.83 (3d Cir. 1990), we 
acknowledged that the District Court has the power to 
redact the indictment if doing so would be appropriate to 
avoid prejudice to the defendant. See also United States v. 
Roy, 473 F.3d 1232, 1237 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (noting that 
court may redact an indictment before submitting it to the 
jury). 
While both Nicholas and Brand objected in general 
terms to the District Court’s decision to provide the 
indictment to the jury, they have not directed us to any 
specific request to redact the information they now claim 
is prejudicial. And the District Court provided a limiting 
instruction on four occasions during its charge, repeatedly 
emphasizing that the indictment was not evidence. 
JA5765, 5767, 5782, 5880. The Court instructed the jury 
on its duty to base its verdict “solely upon the evidence in 
the case.” JA5764. Just before the jury retired to 
deliberate, the Court reiterated that the purpose of the 
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indictment is to set forth the charges, and that it is “merely 
an accusation.” JA5909. 
“[J]uries are presumed to follow their instructions 
. . . .” Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987). In 
our view, Juror 12’s assertion that the indictment was 
being considered evidence does not, standing alone, 
establish that his fellow jurors actually did so. We reject 
the notion that the jury, after hearing weeks of testimony 
and having viewed substantial documentary evidence, 
went on to ignore the Court’s limiting instruction 
concerning the indictment.26 Accordingly, we conclude 
                                              
26 We acknowledge that our case law provides minimal 
guidance to district courts concerning the practice of 
sending an indictment to the jury for their use during 
deliberations. We are also aware that some courts have 
disapproved the practice of sending the indictment out 
with the jury. See United States v. Esso, 684 F.3d 347, 352 
n.5 (2d Cir. 2012); Roy, 473 F.3d at 1237 n.2. We 
emphasize that this practice is committed to the sound 
discretion of the district judge. Todaro, 448 F.2d at 66. In 
our view, such an exercise of a judge’s discretion should 
be informed by considering the nature of the case, the 
number of defendants, the length of the indictment, the 
extent of the factual recitation supporting the criminal 
charges, and most importantly, whether the indictment 
(especially if lengthy and fact-laden) will be useful to the 
jury, in light of the judge’s own carefully tailored jury 
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that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
sending the indictment out to the jury. 
IX. The District Court’s Evidentiary Rulings 
Vederman, Nicholas, and Brand each challenge 
evidentiary rulings by the District Court. We conclude that 
none of these contentions warrants setting aside their 
convictions. 
A. The District Court’s Application of Rule 404(b) 
Vederman argues that the District Court misapplied 
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) when it excluded 
evidence of Vederman’s prior gift-giving.27 This Court 
reviews a district court’s application of Rule 404(b) for 
abuse of discretion. United States v. Daraio, 445 F.3d 253, 
                                              
instruction, as supplemented by a verdict slip. See Esso, 
684 F.3d at 352 n.5. 
27 Although Rule 404(b) determinations are usually in 
response to attempts to introduce “bad” acts evidence, 
Vederman’s attempt to introduce “good” acts of gift-
giving is properly analyzed under the same rule. Ansell v. 
Green Acres Contracting Co., 347 F.3d 515, 520 (3d Cir. 
2003) (“The evidence admitted in this case differs from 
garden variety Rule 404(b) matter because it is evidence, 
not of a prior bad act in a criminal case, but of a subsequent 
good act in a civil case. Nonetheless, this evidence is 
encompassed by the plain text of Rule 404(b) which 
addresses ‘other . . . acts,’ not just prior bad acts.”). 
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259 (3d Cir. 2006); Ansell v. Green Acres Contracting Co., 
347 F.3d 515, 519 (3d Cir. 2003). A trial court commits 
“[a]n abuse of discretion . . . when [the] district court’s 
decision rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an 
errant conclusion of law or an improper application of law 
to fact.” Pardini v. Allegheny Intermediate Unit, 524 F.3d 
419, 422 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting P.N. v. Clementon Bd. of 
Educ., 442 F.3d 848, 852 (3d Cir. 2006)). 
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides in part: 
(b) Crimes, Wrongs, or Other Acts. 
(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a 
crime, wrong, or other act is not 
admissible to prove a person’s 
character in order to show that on a 
particular occasion the person 
acted in accordance with the 
character. 
(2) Permitted Uses; Notice in a 
Criminal Case. This evidence may 
be admissible for another purpose, 
such as proving motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge, identity, absence 
of mistake, or lack of accident. 
Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1)–(2). 
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At trial, Vederman sought to present a witness from 
American University who would have testified that 
“Vederman agreed, on more than fifty instances, to 
financially assist students [at American] who needed help 
with tuition, book money, or travel funds to visit their 
families.” Vederman Br. 42 (emphasis omitted). 
According to Vederman, the testimony was relevant to 
refuting the Government’s argument that he agreed to 
guarantee the tuition expenses of Fattah’s au pair as a way 
of bribing the congressman. In excluding this evidence 
under Rule 404(b), the District Court stated at sidebar: 
I sustain the government’s objection to 
calling a representative of American 
University to testify on behalf of Herbert 
Vederman. 
In my view the testimony runs afoul of 
Rule 404(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence. I find it to be propensity evidence. 
He or she would be testifying about Mr. 
Vederman’s financial generosity with respect 
to students of American University. 
The issue here is payment of partial 
tuition of a student at the Philadelphia 
University. I see no connection between the 
generosity at American University and the 
situation with Philadelphia University. 
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JA4459–60. Vederman argues that because the proposed 
evidence related to Vederman’s intent, and not solely his 
propensity to perform good acts, we should conclude that 
the District Court abused its discretion. We see no error in 
the District Court’s ruling. 
Vederman challenges as arbitrary the District 
Court’s “assertion that support for American University 
students is too remote from support for Philadelphia 
University students” such that it constitutes inadmissible 
evidence. Vederman Reply Br. 23. This distinction was far 
from arbitrary. Vederman may well have financially 
supported American University students because of 
connections he had to that school or to the D.C. 
community at large—connections Vederman did not have 
to Philadelphia University. And the excluded testimony 
appears to have described support for students Vederman 
did not previously know. By supporting Fattah’s au pair, 
Vederman was helping an employee of a man whom he 
knew quite well. JA889 (“[Fattah and Vederman] spent a 
lot of time together traveling back and forth to 
Washington, in the case of a death in the family attending 
certain ceremonies that were important, and above all 
spending time with each other and their families 
together.”). Vederman’s decision to help Fattah’s au pair, 
who wished to attend Philadelphia University, seems more 
like a departure from, rather than a continuation of, his 
pattern of support for American University students. 
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As the party seeking admission of evidence under 
Rule 404(b), Vederman bore “the burden of demonstrating 
its applicability” and “identifying a proper purpose.” 
United States v. Caldwell, 760 F.3d 267, 276 (3d Cir. 
2014). By failing to explain sufficiently why the factual 
distinctions discussed above were not material, Vederman 
failed to meet his burden. In particular, although 
Vederman argues that he offered evidence of his prior gift-
giving to prove intent—“a proper non-propensity 
purpose”—he failed to show why the proposed testimony 
was “relevant to that identified purpose.” Id. at 277.28 As 
we noted in Ansell v. Green Acres Contracting, an 
employment discrimination case on which Vederman 
heavily relies, “[t]here is. . . no bright line rule for 
determining when evidence is too remote to be relevant.” 
347 F.3d at 525. As such, a district court’s determination 
under Rule 404(b) “will not be disturbed on appeal unless 
it amounts to an abuse of discretion.” Id. The District 
                                              
28 Under Rule 404(b), “prior act evidence is inadmissible 
unless the evidence is (1) offered for a proper non-
propensity purpose that is at issue in the case; (2) relevant 
to that identified purpose; (3) sufficiently probative under 
Rule 403 such that its probative value is not outweighed 
by any inherent danger of unfair prejudice; and 
(4) accompanied by a limiting instruction, if requested.” 
United States v. Caldwell, 760 F.3d 267, 277–78 (3d Cir. 
2014). 
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Court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of 
Vederman’s support for students at American University. 
B. Evidentiary Rulings Regarding Nicholas’s Defense 
Nicholas argues that the District Court rendered 
three erroneous evidentiary rulings that prejudiced her 
defense. We do not find any of her arguments convincing. 
1. The EAA Board Minutes 
In support of its theory that Nicholas defrauded 
EAA, the Government introduced minutes from EAA’s 
Board. Minutes from 2005 revealed that the Board limited 
Nicholas’s signing authority to $100,000. Minutes from 
December 2007, February 2008, and May 2008 failed to 
reference either the EAA–Solutions contract or the checks, 
drawn from EAA’s account for $500,000 and $100,000, 
that were purportedly paid pursuant to the contract. 
Nicholas contends that the Board minutes were 
erroneously admitted because they constituted improper 
hearsay which failed to satisfy either the exception for 
business records under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) 
or the absence of records exception under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 803(7). “We review the District Court’s 
evidentiary ruling[s] for abuse of discretion, but also 
‘exercise plenary review . . . to the extent [the rulings] are 
based on a legal interpretation of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence.’ ” Repak, 852 F.3d at 240 (citations omitted) 
(second alteration in original). 
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Applying those standards here,29 we conclude there 
was sufficient basis to admit exhibit EAA-48 under 
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) as a business record.  
Although allowing the prosecution to inquire over 
Nicholas’s earlier objection based on Federal Rule of 
Evidence 803(7) to the absence of any mention of the 
$500,000 check in the 2008 Board Minutes was error, it 
was not reversible error. Other evidence in the record 
overwhelmingly showed that Nicholas made the $500,000 
and $100,000 payments to Solutions with the requisite 
fraudulent intent. That evidence included the 2005 policy 
limiting Nicholas’s authority to approve expenditures to 
$100,000, the accountant’s testimony about the 
disbursement policy requiring the completion of a check 
request form for the issuance of a check, and Jones’ 
testimony that he never saw a request for the $500,000 
check. That evidence, coupled with Nicholas’s tendering 
of the upfront half-million dollar payment before the terms 
of the purported agreement had been finalized or executed, 
her failure to mention the $600,000 in payments to 
Solutions during her interview with FBI Agent 
                                              
29 We note that the argument section of Nicholas’s brief on 
this issue specifically cited to the page in the record where 
exhibit EAA-48 was admitted without objection by any 
defense counsel. See Appellant’s Br. at 57 (citing JA4381-
82). Nonetheless, there was an earlier objection to the 
admission of exhibit EAA-48 that was preserved and that 
was referenced in a string citation elsewhere in Nicholas’s 
brief. 
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Dieffenbach, and her alteration of EAA’s general ledger 
to conceal the $100,000 payment, makes it “highly 
probable” that the jury would have reached the same 
result. See United States v. Friedman, 658 F.3d 342, 352 
(3d Cir. 2011).  
Nicholas also asserts that the Board minutes were 
unfairly prejudicial. We disagree. Any possible prejudice 
was minimized by the fact that the Board minutes make no 
reference to either the EAA–Solutions contract or to any 
financial matters whatsoever. Indeed, given these lacunae 
in the Government’s proof, a reasonable factfinder might 
well have concluded that the Board’s intention to limit 
Nicholas’s signing authority had not been implemented 
and that Nicholas had not concealed the contract from the 
Board. 
2. Jones’ Memory Regarding Other Contracts 
Nicholas next asserts that the District Court erred 
during her cross-examination of Board Chairman Jones by 
sustaining the prosecution’s objection to her inquiry into 
whether he remembered other contracts in excess of 
$100,000 being brought to the Board. See JA1386–87. The 
basis of the prosecution’s objection seemed to be that 
Nicholas’s line of inquiry was beyond the scope of the 
direct testimony. JA1387 (“I showed checks concerning 
what’s going on, not other programs.”); see Fed. R. Evid. 
611(b). The District Court sustained the objection, 
declaring that “it has absolutely nothing to do with this 
case.” JA1387. Nicholas contends that if Jones did not 
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recall whether other large contracts had been presented to 
the Board, his inability to recall the EAA–Solutions 
contract would have been “unremarkable rather than 
evidence of fraud or concealment.” Nicholas Br. 61. 
We acknowledge that whether Jones remembered 
other large contracts requiring Board approval had some 
relevance under Rule 401. Yet any error by the District 
Court in prohibiting Nicholas’s counsel from pursuing this 
line of inquiry is harmless. Jones admitted that he did not 
know if the Board ever implemented the policy requiring 
its approval of contracts exceeding $100,000. He also 
conceded that the EAA Board focused less on the financial 
side of EAA than on its programs. JA1383–85. Nicholas 
could not have been prejudiced by the District Court’s 
ruling. 
3. Exclusion of NOAA Evidence 
Nicholas defended against the criminal charges 
arising out of the non-existent October 2012 conference 
by asserting that she acted in “good faith in spending the 
NOAA funds on EAA expenses,” Nicholas Br. 64, that the 
difference in the dates in the paperwork was not material, 
and that NOAA had received the benefits of the 
sponsorship because its logo was displayed on the signage 
used at the February conference. Nicholas succeeded in 
presenting testimony and introducing photographs that 
showed NOAA’s logo on the February 2012 annual 
conference bags, padfolios, and name tags. The Court 
excluded a photograph of a NOAA intern at the February 
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2012 conference, other photographs of the February 
conference signage, and some checks that pertained to the 
February conference. Nicholas claims that her inability to 
introduce those exhibits frustrated her ability to present 
her good faith defense. We are not persuaded. 
The photographs were excluded as cumulative, the 
sort of ruling to which we afford trial judges very broad 
discretion. See Fed. R. Evid. 403; United States v. 
Dalfonso, 707 F.2d 757, 762 (3d Cir. 1983). It was not 
error to exclude the student intern’s photograph. The 
conference brochure included photographs from previous 
conferences, and the witness from NOAA was unable to 
testify to the year the student served as an intern. Finally, 
the checks tendered for the travel expenses incurred for the 
February conference were excluded as irrelevant to 
whether Nicholas had a good faith belief that NOAA 
sponsored the October conference. 
C. The Cooperating Witness’s Mental Health Records 
During discovery, Brand learned that a cooperating 
witness was diagnosed with bipolar II disorder and was 
taking medication to treat that condition. Brand 
subpoenaed mental health records kept by the witness’s 
current and former psychiatrists in hopes of using those 
records to attack the witness’s memory, truthfulness, and 
credibility. The witness and the Government both filed 
motions to quash the subpoena, arguing that the witness’s 
mental health records were protected by the 
psychotherapist–patient privilege recognized by the 
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Supreme Court in Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996). 
The Government also filed a motion in limine seeking to 
restrict the scope of cross-examination to prevent Brand 
from questioning the witness about his mental health. 
Alongside his motion to quash, the witness 
voluntarily produced for the Court his mental health 
records. The Court concluded that the psychotherapist–
patient privilege would ordinarily apply to the mental 
health records, but that the privilege was not absolute, 
especially when invoked in response to a criminal 
defendant’s efforts to obtain through discovery evidence 
that is favorable to his case. Following the procedure set 
forth in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987), the 
District Court conducted an in camera review of the 
mental health records to determine if they contained 
material evidence—that is, evidence that would “give[] 
rise to a reasonable probability that it [would] affect the 
outcome of the case.” JA149. The District Court found 
“nothing in the mental health records of the [witness] . . . 
material for this criminal action,” noting that “[t]he 
records reveal nothing that calls into question [the 
witness’s] memory, perception, competence, or veracity.” 
JA150. Accordingly, the Court entered an order granting 
the motions to quash the subpoena. 
The District Court also granted the Government’s 
motion in limine and restricted the scope of cross-
examination, ruling that “no reference may be made to [the 
witness’s] bipolar disorder or the medications he takes to 
140 
manage it.” JA142, 156. The Court reasoned that bipolar 
disorder varied in its effects from person to person, and 
concluded that Brand had not shown that the effects of the 
disorder had any bearing on the witness’s credibility. The 
District Court ruled that cross-examination would not 
serve any valid impeachment purpose. 
Brand claims that the District Court’s order ran 
afoul of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
and the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. 
We review a district court’s rulings to quash a subpoena 
and to limit the scope of cross-examination for abuse of 
discretion. United States v. Tykarsky, 446 F.3d 458, 475 
(3d Cir. 2006); NLRB v. Frazier, 966 F.2d 812, 815 (3d 
Cir. 1992). Here, the District Court did not abuse that 
discretion. 
1. The District Court’s Denial of Access to the Mental 
Health Records 
In claiming that the District Court’s decision to 
review the mental health records in camera before ruling 
on their admissibility violated his rights under both the 
Fifth and Sixth Amendments, Brand specifically argues 
that his right to confront the witness was impeded because 
he was denied access to records he could have used to 
impeach the witness. This very argument was considered 
and rejected by a plurality of the Supreme Court in Ritchie, 
which noted that “the effect [of the argument] would be to 
transform the Confrontation Clause into a constitutionally 
compelled rule of pretrial discovery. . . . [T]he right to 
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confrontation is a trial right, designed to prevent improper 
restrictions on the types of questions that defense counsel 
may ask during cross-examination.” 480 U.S. at 52. We 
follow the Ritchie plurality, and conclude that the 
Confrontation Clause did not require the District Court to 
grant Brand access to the witness’s mental health records. 
Brand next challenges the District Court’s decision 
to quash the subpoena as a violation of the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. He concedes that 
Ritchie’s Due Process holding allowed the District Court 
to review the mental health records in camera without 
disclosing them to him. See id. at 59–60 (“A defendant’s 
right to discover exculpatory evidence does not include the 
unsupervised authority to search through [the 
Government’s] files. . . . We find that [the defendant’s] 
interest . . . in ensuring a fair trial can be protected fully by 
requiring that the [privileged] files be submitted only to 
the trial court for in camera review.”). Brand instead 
argues that the District Court abused its discretion by 
focusing on “irrelevant facts and spurious symptoms. . . . 
such as ‘hallucinations,’ ” and by “refus[ing] to consider 
evidence of cognitive impairment and memory issues.” 
Brand Br. 30. The record reveals, however, that the 
District Court reviewed the mental health records and 
determined that they “reveal[ed] nothing that calls into 
question [the witness’s] memory, perception, competence, 
or veracity.” JA150. This hardly amounts to a refusal to 
consider evidence of cognitive impairment or memory 
issues. 
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Brand also challenges the legal standard applied by 
the District Court, arguing that the court “focused solely 
on whether disclosure would ‘change the outcome’ of 
Brand’s trial,” Brand Br. 29 (quoting JA148), rather than 
considering “whether the ultimate verdict is one ‘worthy 
of confidence.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Robinson, 
583 F.3d 1265, 1270 (10th Cir. 2009)). Brand 
misleadingly quotes from the District Court’s opinion. The 
District Court considered, in accordance with Ritchie, 
“whether there is a reasonable probability that disclosure 
would change the outcome” of Brand’s trial, JA148 
(emphasis added), not whether disclosure would 
necessarily change the outcome. As articulated in Ritchie, 
a “ ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome.” 480 U.S. at 57 
(quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) 
(Blackmun, J.)). The District Court applied the correct 
standard. 
2. The District Court’s Grant of the Motion in Limine 
In granting the Government’s motion in limine, the 
District Court ruled that Brand could not “reference . . . 
[the witness’s] bipolar disorder or the medications he takes 
to manage it.” JA156. Yet that ruling placed no restriction 
on Brand’s ability to cross-examine the witness with 
respect to “his memory, competence, or truthfulness.” Id. 
Brand argues, nevertheless, that his Sixth Amendment 
right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him” 
was violated. U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
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The Confrontation Clause protects a defendant’s 
right to cross-examine a witness with respect to any 
testimonial statements made by that witness. United States 
v. Berrios, 676 F.3d 118, 125–26 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing 
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004), and 
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 823–24 (2006)). But 
the scope of cross-examination is not unlimited, and “[a] 
district court retains ‘wide latitude insofar as the 
Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable 
limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about 
. . . harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the 
witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only 
marginally relevant.’ ” John-Baptiste, 747 F.3d at 211 
(quoting United States v. Mussare, 405 F.3d 161, 169 (3d 
Cir. 2005)). We review limitations on cross-examination 
for abuse of discretion, and reverse “only when the 
restriction ‘is so severe as to constitute a denial of the 
defendant’s right to confront witnesses against him and . . . 
is prejudicial to [his] substantial rights.’ ” Id. (alternation 
in original) (quoting United States v. Conley, 92 F.3d 157, 
169 (3d Cir. 1996)). 
In United States v. Chandler, 326 F.3d 210, 219 (3d 
Cir. 2003), we analyzed whether a district court’s decision 
to limit cross-examination with respect to a witness’s 
motivation for testifying violated the Confrontation 
Clause. See also Mussare, 405 F.3d at 169; John-Baptiste, 
747 F.3d at 211–12. Consistent with Delaware v. Van 
Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986), we first concluded that “the 
exposure of a witness’ motivation in testifying is a proper 
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and important function of the constitutionally protected 
right of cross-examination.” Chandler, 326 F.3d at 219–
20 (quoting Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 678–79). We also 
noted that the Confrontation Clause does not prevent a trial 
judge from imposing reasonable limits on cross-
examination. Id. In reviewing a district judge’s imposition 
of such limitations, we apply a two-part analysis. As we 
have since described, “we inquire into: ‘(1) whether the 
limitation significantly limited the defendant’s right to 
inquire into a witness’s motivation for testifying; and 
(2) whether the constraints imposed fell within the 
reasonable limits that a district court has the authority to 
impose.’ ” John-Baptiste, 747 F.3d at 211–12 (quoting 
Mussare, 405 F.3d at 169). 
The same analytical framework is appropriate when 
determining whether a restriction on the cross-
examination of a witness with respect to his memory and 
perception violates the Confrontation Clause. See Davis v. 
Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974); Greene v. McElroy, 360 
U.S. 474, 496 (1959); United States v. Segal, 534 F.2d 
578, 582 (3d Cir. 1976). Memory and perception, like 
motivation for testifying, are central issues affecting the 
credibility of any witness, and unreasonable limitations on 
the right to cross-examine on those subjects cannot be 
countenanced. We therefore ask, paraphrasing Chandler: 
(1) whether the District Court’s decision to put the 
witness’s diagnosis and medications off limits 
significantly impaired Brand’s right to inquire into the 
witness’s memory and perception; and (2) whether the 
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ruling fell within the reasonable limits that the District 
Court has the authority to impose. 
We conclude that the District Court did not err. As 
an initial matter, the District Court permitted Brand to 
cross-examine the witness about his memory and 
perception, and limited cross-examination only with 
respect to the witness’s bipolar disorder and the 
medications he was taking to treat that condition. Brand 
was free to question the witness about his memory and 
perception, and indeed did so. The restriction on asking 
the witness about his bipolar disorder was not a significant 
limitation of Brand’s right to inquire into the witness’s 
memory or perception. Moreover, as the District Court 
pointed out, Brand failed to show how inquiry into the 
witness’s bipolar disorder would be useful for 
impeachment purposes. See JA154. 
Given that failure, the District Court’s limits on 
cross-examination were reasonable. The Court concluded, 
after reviewing the evidence submitted by Brand and the 
witness’s mental health records, that any mention of the 
witness’s bipolar disorder would “only be designed to 
confuse the jury or to stigmatize him unfairly because of a 
‘mental problem’ without any countervailing probative 
value.” JA155. The District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in limiting Brand’s cross-examination on a topic 
that would be far more prejudicial than probative. See 
Tykarsky, 446 F.3d at 476–77 (“[T]he District Court acted 
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well within its discretion to restrict irrelevant and 
confusing testimony.”). 
All of this is not to suggest that a witness’s mental 
health is always off limits. The appropriate course in any 
given case must be determined from the facts and 
circumstances surrounding that case and the witness’s 
particular condition. See United States v. George, 532 F.3d 
933, 937 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“The days are long past when 
any mental illness was presumed to undermine a witness’s 
competence to testify. . . . [M]ental illness [is] potentially 
relevant in a broad[] range of circumstances . . . . [But] 
some indication is needed that a particular witness’s 
medical history throws some doubt on the witness’s 
competence or credibility.”). Here, Brand failed to show, 
through mental health records or otherwise, any 
particularized reason to doubt the credibility of the witness 
for medical reasons. 
Brand states that the witness provided “the only 
evidence offered” on the intent element of his conspiracy 
conviction and that he should therefore be entitled to 
unrestricted cross-examination. Brand Br. 12 n.3. Yet no 
matter the importance of a witness to any party, a district 
court may always place reasonable limits on cross-
examination to avoid “harassment, prejudice, confusion of 
the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is 
repetitive or only marginally relevant.” John-Baptiste, 747 
F.3d at 211 (citation omitted). 
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We conclude that the District Court did not abuse 
its discretion in restricting the scope of Brand’s cross-
examination of the cooperating witness. 
X. The Government’s Cross-Appeal 
The jury convicted Fattah, Vederman, and Bowser 
of bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 134430 (Count 19) and making 
false statements to a financial institution, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 101431 (Count 20). In response to post-trial motions, the 
District Court granted a judgment of acquittal on both 
counts under Fed. R. Crim. P. 29, concluding that the 
                                              
30 “Whoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, 
a scheme or artifice . . . to defraud a financial institution 
. . . shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned 
not more than 30 years, or both.” The definition of 
“financial institution” for purposes of § 1344 is set forth at 
18 U.S.C. § 20, and includes “a credit union with accounts 
insured by the National Credit Union Share Insurance 
Fund” and “a mortgage lending business (as defined in 
section 27 of this Title).” 18 U.S.C. §§ 20(2), (10). 
31 “Whoever knowingly makes any false statement or 
report, or willfully overvalues any land, property or 
security, for the purpose of influencing in any way the 
action of . . . a Federal credit union . . . any institution the 
accounts of which are insured by . . . the National Credit 
Union Administration Board . . . or a mortgage lending 
business . . . shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or 
imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.” 
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evidence was insufficient to establish that the Credit 
Union Mortgage Association (CUMA), the entity to whom 
Fattah, Vederman, and Bowser made the false statements, 
is a “financial institution,” or, more specifically, a 
“mortgage lending business” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 27. 
The Government claims that, viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to it, the District Court erred and that 
CUMA is, indeed, a “mortgage lending business.” We 
agree. Because the evidence is sufficient to support the 
jury’s verdict, we will remand so Fattah and Vederman 
may be resentenced on these charges.32 
A. CUMA is a Mortgage Lending Business 
In reviewing the District Court’s post-verdict 
judgment of acquittal under Rule 29 of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, we consider whether the evidence, 
when viewed in a light most favorable to the government, 
supports the jury’s verdict. United States v. Dixon, 658 
F.2d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 1981). Our standard of review is the 
same as that applied by the District Court, and we must 
uphold the jury’s verdict unless no reasonable juror could 
accept the evidence as sufficient to support the defendant’s 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. 
Coleman, 811 F.2d 804, 807 (3d Cir. 1987). 
                                              
32 Because the Government did not file an appeal as to 
Bowser, the cross-appeal is limited to Fattah and 
Vederman. The judgment of acquittal as to Bowser is 
therefore unaffected by our ruling today. 
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Initially, the grand jury’s indictment alleged that 
CUMA is a financial institution because it is federally 
insured. JA302–03. At trial, however, the jury was 
instructed that CUMA could qualify as a financial 
institution either because it is federally insured or because 
it is a “mortgage lending business.” See JA111, 401–02. A 
“mortgage lending business” is “an organization which 
finances or refinances any debt secured by an interest in 
real estate, including private mortgage companies and any 
subsidiaries of such organizations, and whose activities 
affect interstate or foreign commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 27. 
At trial, CUMA’s president and CEO, Eddie Scott 
Toler, testified that CUMA is not federally insured. 
JA4235. The Government therefore attempted to prove 
that CUMA is a “mortgage lending business” by 
presenting evidence that CUMA funds mortgages and then 
sells them in a secondary market. 
Toler also testified that CUMA is a “credit union 
service organization”—a for-profit company owned by 48 
credit unions, which serves small credit unions that do not 
have the infrastructure or in-house expertise to handle 
mortgage loans themselves. JA4235. According to Toler, 
“[CUMA] exclusively provide[s] First Trust Residential 
Mortgage loaning [sic] services, all the way from the 
origination of the mortgage loan through processing, 
underwriting, closing and access to the secondary market 
where—and we’re selling the mortgage loan on the 
secondary market.” JA4236–37. In jurisdictions in which 
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CUMA is licensed,33 CUMA holds the mortgage for a 
limited period, generally from two to thirty days, and then 
sells the mortgage either to a partner credit union or on the 
secondary market. JA4240. 
The District Court concluded that CUMA is not a 
“mortgage lending business” because “[t]he record is 
devoid of any evidence that CUMA finances or refinances 
any debt.” JA113. Concluding that CUMA “simply is a 
loan processor for various credit unions which do the 
financing or refinancing,” id., the District Court ruled that 
CUMA’s “activity does not constitute the financing or 
refinancing of any debt. CUMA is not the mortgagee. It is 
merely selling the debt instrument to a third party.” JA114. 
We cannot agree with the District Court’s view of 
the evidence. Toler testified that in “Maryland, D.C., and 
Virginia . . . all of the loans are closed in the name of 
CUMA.” JA4238–39. As Toler described it, CUMA 
borrows on a line of credit to fund the loan, and when the 
loan is sold, CUMA pays off its line of credit. JA4239–40. 
So contrary to the District Court’s assessment, the 
evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the 
Government, shows that CUMA is indeed the 
mortgagee—at least during the time from closing until the 
loan is sold to a partner credit union or on the secondary 
market. The fact that CUMA funds the closing and then 
                                              
33 CUMA is licensed in Maryland, Washington, D.C., and 
Virginia. JA4238. 
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holds the mortgage, even for a brief time, is sufficient to 
support a conclusion that CUMA is “an organization 
which finances or refinances any debt secured by an 
interest in real estate.” 18 U.S.C. § 27. 
Fattah and Vederman attempt to refute the argument 
that CUMA engages in financing mortgages by focusing 
on Toler’s testimony that CUMA “doesn’t actually have 
any money to fund these mortgage loans.” JA4239; see 
Fattah Reply Br. 38, Vederman Reply Br. 36. But Toler 
testified that CUMA employs a credit line to borrow the 
funds necessary to close on mortgages. See JA4239. That 
CUMA incurs debt to finance mortgages hardly 
undermines a conclusion that CUMA finances mortgages. 
Indeed, it is the very nature of modern banking that 
financial institutions do not hold cash reserves equal to the 
full amount of their liabilities. See, e.g., Timothy C. 
Harker, Bailment Ailment: An Analysis of the Legal Status 
of Ordinary Demand Deposits in the Shadow of the 
Financial Crisis of 2008, 19 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 
543, 561 (2014) (“[F]ractional reserve banking . . . is the 
de facto standard for all modern banks.”). 
Vederman also argues that, even if CUMA acts as a 
mortgage lending business in some transactions, it was not 
acting as a mortgage lending business in this transaction. 
Vederman points to Toler’s testimony that, in a state in 
which CUMA is not licensed, the mortgage is closed in the 
name of a credit union. In such cases, the credit union, and 
not CUMA, owns the mortgage for the short period before 
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the loan is sold on the secondary market. JA4241. CUMA 
is not licensed in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. See 
id. Thus, according to Vederman, CUMA was acting in its 
capacity as a mortgage servicing company for Fattah’s 
vacation home purchase and did not—and could not—
finance Fattah’s mortgage. That would mean that CUMA 
could not have been a victim of a crime against a financial 
institution in this instance: “When an entity is not 
functioning as a mortgage lender, the ‘pertinent federal 
interest’ behind the statutes is not implicated.” Vederman 
Reply Br. 38 (citation omitted). 
The Government responds that neither of the 
statutes of conviction requires that the fraud or false 
statement occur in connection with the same transaction 
that places the entity within the definition of “financial 
institution.” Gov’t Fourth Step Br. 4. We agree with the 
Government. 
Both § 1344 and § 1014 protect entities that fall 
within the definition of “financial institution” and are 
otherwise quite broad in their application. See Loughrin v. 
United States, 134 S. Ct. 2384, 2389 (2014) (interpreting 
§ 1344 as not requiring specific intent to defraud a bank); 
United States v. Boren, 278 F.3d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(“[Section 1014’s] reach is not limited to false statements 
made with regard to loans, but extends to any application, 
commitment or other specified transaction.”). Neither 
statute is expressly limited in the manner that Vederman 
suggests. Williams v. United States, 458 U.S. 279, 284 
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(1982) (“To obtain a conviction under § 1014, the 
Government must establish two propositions: it must 
demonstrate (1) that the defendant made a ‘false statement 
or report,’ . . . and (2) that he did so ‘for the purpose of 
influencing in any way the action of [a described financial 
institution] upon any application, advance, . . . 
commitment, or loan.’ ”); United States v. Leahy, 445 F.3d 
634, 646 (3d Cir. 2006) (“The purpose of the bank fraud 
statute is to protect the ‘financial integrity of [banking] 
institutions.’ ”) (citing S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 377 (1983), 
as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3517), abrogated on 
other grounds by Loughrin, 134 S. Ct. at 2389. 
In support of his position, Vederman relies on 
United States v. Devoll, 39 F.3d 575 (5th Cir. 1994), in 
which the Fifth Circuit concluded that § 1014 (false 
statements to a financial institution) is not intended to 
capture fraud unrelated to an entity’s lending activities, 
and therefore held that it “applies only to actions involving 
lending transactions.” Id. at 580. The Fifth Circuit stated: 
[W]e are not persuaded that the statute 
imposes liability whenever a defendant’s 
false statement was intended to interfere with 
any activity of a financial institution; such a 
broad interpretation of section 1014 
presumably would encompass fraud or false 
representations having nothing to do with 
financial transactions, such as fraud in an 
employment contract or, for example, in a 
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contract to provide goods or services for 
custodial care, premises repair, or renovation. 
Id. 
Yet a majority of circuits, including our own, have 
declined to follow Devoll’s suggestion that § 1014 is 
restricted to lending transactions. As the Ninth Circuit has 
held, “we join at least six of our sister circuits—the First, 
Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth—in holding that 
18 U.S.C. § 1014 is not limited to lending transactions, 
and reject the minority rule to the contrary.” Boren, 278 
F.3d at 915. And even if we were to adopt Devoll’s narrow 
construction of § 1014 to lending transactions, that would 
not resolve the more specific question of whether the 
defrauded entity must be defined as a “mortgage lending 
business” by virtue of the specific transaction in which the 
false statements arose. 
Recently, the Eighth Circuit addressed precisely 
this issue. In United States v. Springer, 866 F.3d 949 (8th 
Cir. 2017), that Court considered the defendant’s appeal 
from the district court’s denial of a Rule 29 motion on 
grounds that GMAC, the entity defrauded, was not a 
“financial institution.” The Court upheld the district 
court’s determination that the evidence was sufficient to 
establish that GMAC is in the mortgage lending business 
because there was testimony that “it had made hundreds or 
thousands of loans secured by mortgages in 2010 and 2011 
in states all across the country,” which established that its 
activities affect interstate commerce. Id. at 953. It was not 
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determinative that GMAC did not own the specific loan at 
issue in the case: “we discern no requirement in the 
definition of ‘mortgage lending business’ that the business 
own the particular loan in question; it need only finance or 
refinance any debt secured by an interest in real estate, or, 
in other words, be in the interstate mortgage lending 
business in general.” Id. 
In our view, the Eighth Circuit’s analysis is correct. 
We therefore adopt that Court’s reasoning in Springer and 
conclude that it is of no moment that CUMA did not 
finance the mortgage at issue in Fattah’s case. CUMA is a 
“mortgage lending business,” and that alone suffices to 
support the convictions under §§ 1014 and 1344. 
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence 
Finally, Vederman argues that, even if CUMA is a 
financial institution, the judgment of acquittal should 
stand because the Government did not put forth any 
evidence that he made a false representation to CUMA.34 
Specifically, Vederman argues that the title to the Porsche 
was actually changed to his name, making it a “true sale” 
as a matter of law, without regard to whether Fattah’s wife 
                                              
34 Although Vederman presented this argument in his Rule 
29 motion, the District Court did not need to reach it in the 
context of Counts 19 and 20 because the Court granted the 
motion on the ground that CUMA is not a financial 
institution. The District Court rejected the argument as to 
Counts 16, 17, and 18. See JA100–02. 
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continued to retain possession. See United States v. 
Castro, 704 F.3d 125, 139 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding in 
another context that “the government must be able to show 
that [the defendant] made a statement to government 
agents that was untrue, and the government cannot satisfy 
that burden by showing that the defendant intended to 
deceive, if in fact he told the literal truth”); see also 75 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 102 (defining “owner” as “[a] person, other 
than a lienholder, having the property right in or title to a 
vehicle”). 
The Government responds that, regardless of 
whether it is legally possible for one person to hold a title 
while a different person possesses the vehicle, the jury was 
permitted to consider all the circumstances in deciding 
whether the Porsche sale was a sham. We agree. 
First, as the District Court observed, it was unclear 
as to whether the title had been properly executed under 
Pennsylvania law. For instance, Fattah’s wife never 
appeared before a notary.35 JA101. In addition, title 75, 
section 1111(a) of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes 
requires that, “[i]n the event of the sale or transfer of the 
ownership of a vehicle within this Commonwealth, the 
owner shall . . . deliver the certificate to the transferee at 
                                              
35 Vederman argues that it is of no significance that the 
parties did not appear before a notary as the statute 
requires, but he offers cases only from states other than 
Pennsylvania to support this proposition. 
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the time of the delivery of the vehicle.” And, the transferee 
must, within twenty days of the assignment of the vehicle, 
apply for a new title. See 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1111(b). 
Neither of these requirements was fulfilled. Finally, 
Vederman never registered the Porsche in his name with 
the Department of Motor Vehicles. See id.; JA4254. 
Second, and more importantly, even if the title had 
been properly transferred to Vederman, the title provisions 
of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code “were [not] 
designed to establish conclusively the ownership of an 
automobile.” Weigelt v. Factors Credit Corp., 101 A.2d 
404, 404 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1953). Indeed, “[t]he purpose of 
a certificate of title is not to conclusively establish 
ownership in a motor vehicle, but rather to establish the 
person entitled to possession.” Speck Cadillac-Olds, Inc. 
v. Goodman, 95 A.2d 191, 193 (Pa. 1953). Thus, a title 
provides evidence of ownership; it is not dispositive of the 
issue. Wasilko v. Home Mut. Cas. Co., 232 A.2d 60, 61 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1967). 
Vederman’s argument that the title in his name 
constitutes conclusive evidence of ownership rests upon 
an erroneous conclusion that the jury was prohibited from 
considering all the circumstances of the transfer. As the 
District Court observed, though, Pennsylvania’s 
Commonwealth Court has held that “[w]hether a 
transferor has transferred ownership of a motor vehicle to 
a transferee is a factual determination to be made by the 
court below.” Dep’t. of Transp. v. Walker, 584 A.2d 1080, 
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1082 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990). Thus, the signed certificate 
of title was appropriately treated as one piece of evidence 
for the jury to consider in assessing the validity of the 
vehicle transfer. Considered in the light most favorable to 
the Government, the totality of the evidence is sufficient 
to support the jury’s conclusion that the Porsche sale was 
a sham. 
XI. Prejudicial Spillover 
Finally, Fattah, Vederman, Nicholas, and Brand 
each contend that their convictions on various counts 
resulted from prejudicial spillover. We are not persuaded. 
We exercise plenary review over a district court’s 
denial of a claim of prejudicial spillover, United States v. 
Lee, 612 F.3d 170, 178–79 (3d Cir. 2010), and we apply a 
two-step test when reviewing such a claim. United States 
v. Wright, 665 F.3d 560, 575 (3d Cir. 2002). First, a court 
must consider “whether the jury heard evidence that would 
have been inadmissible at a trial limited to the remaining 
valid count[s].” Id. (quoting United States v. Cross, 308 
F.3d 308, 317 (3d Cir. 2002)). The second step requires 
that we “ask whether that evidence (the ‘spillover 
evidence’) was prejudicial.” Id. We consider four factors: 
“whether (1) the charges are intertwined with each other; 
(2) the evidence for the remaining counts is sufficiently 
distinct to support the verdict on these counts; (3) the 
elimination of the invalid count [will] significantly 
change[] the strategy of the trial; and (4) the prosecution 
used language of the sort to arouse a jury.” Id. (quoting 
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United States v. Murphy, 323 F.3d 102, 118 (3d Cir. 
2003)); see also United States v. Pelullo (Pellulo II), 14 
F.3d 881, 898–99 (3d. Cir. 1994). These four factors are 
considered in a light “somewhat favorable to the 
defendant.” Wright, 665 F.3d at 575 (quoting Murphy, 323 
F.3d at 122); see also Gov’t Br. 198 (same). 
A. Fattah’s Claim of Prejudicial Spillover 
Fattah argues that he suffered prejudicial spillover 
on the remaining counts of conviction in light of (1) 
evidence pertinent to the alleged Vederman bribery 
schemes that is now arguably inadmissible under 
McDonnell; and (2) “the government’s flawed RICO 
conspiracy theory.” Fattah Br. 50, 64. Fattah’s argument 
is undercut substantially because of our determination that 
McDonnell requires a new trial for Counts 16, 17, 22, and 
23 and our decision to affirm the RICO conspiracy 
conviction. The only possible spillover left to consider is 
the evidence pertaining to Fattah’s arranging a meeting 
between Vederman and the U.S. Trade Representative, 
Ron Kirk, which in light of McDonnell is now arguably 
inadmissible.36 
The evidence of the Kirk meeting admitted during 
this five-week trial was limited. Although this evidence 
                                              
36 Nothing in this opinion is intended to foreclose the 
possibility that evidence of the Kirk meeting may be 
admissible on retrial for some purpose other than as proof 
of an official act. 
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was part of the Government’s proof as to both the RICO 
and the bribery related charges, there is more than 
sufficient—and distinct —evidence to support Fattah’s 
conviction on all the other counts. In our view, eliminating 
any evidence of the Kirk meeting would not have altered 
the strategy of the trial, nor should it significantly change 
the strategy for any new trial that may be held. Because 
Fattah has not pointed us to any argument by the 
prosecution relating to this meeting that could have 
inflamed the jury, we conclude that Fattah’s prejudicial 
spillover claim fails. Like the District Court, we presume 
that the jury followed the Court’s instructions to consider 
and weigh separately the evidence on each count as to each 
defendant and not to be swayed by evidence pertaining to 
other defendants.37 
B. Vederman’s Assertion of Prejudicial Spillover 
Because the District Court acquitted Vederman of 
the RICO charge, Vederman argues that he was “severely 
prejudiced by the presentation to the jury of a legally 
flawed racketeering conspiracy charge,” and as a 
consequence his bribery and money laundering 
                                              
37 We likewise reject Brand’s prejudicial spillover 
arguments. See Brand Br. 6 (“Brand adopts the significant 
issue advanced by his co-appellant pursuant to Fed. R. 
App. P. 28(i) that improper jury instructions and the 
resulting spillover of related improperly admitted 
evidence and argument unfairly prejudiced Brand.”). 
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convictions should be overturned. Vederman Br. 46. In 
response to the Government’s appeal of the District 
Court’s Rule 29 acquittal on Counts 19–20 involving 
CUMA, Vederman asserts that these two counts also were 
affected by spillover evidence because the Government’s 
theory tied the bribery charges to the actions taken to 
defraud CUMA. In that we are vacating Vederman’s 
convictions of Counts 16–18 and 22–23 based on 
McDonnell and remanding for further proceedings, we 
need address only Vederman’s argument of prejudicial 
spillover as it relates to the charges involving CUMA in 
Counts 19–20, charges that we will reinstate. 
The District Court’s acquittal of Vederman on the 
RICO count establishes that step one of the Wright 
spillover test has been met. “[T]he jury heard evidence that 
would have been inadmissible at a trial limited” to the 
bribery and CUMA-related counts. Wright, 665 F.3d at 
575 (quoting Cross, 308 F.3d at 317). 
Wright’s second step requires “ask[ing] whether 
that evidence (the ‘spillover evidence’) was prejudicial.” 
Id. Vederman submits that the RICO, bribery, and CUMA-
related charges were intertwined “in that the acts relating 
to the alleged bribery scheme were also charged as 
‘predicates’ under RICO.” Vederman Br. 49. We disagree. 
To be sure, the RICO, bribery, and CUMA Counts 
are related to one another. But in this instance, mere 
relatedness is not enough to demonstrate the foundation 
necessary for spillover. This is so because the bribery 
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charges were a predicate to the RICO charge. In other 
words, the jury had to determine if Vederman was guilty 
of bribery, and the jury then used that “predicate” to 
consider whether he was also guilty of the RICO 
conspiracy. Thus, the necessarily tiered structure of the 
questions presented to the jury refute Vederman’s 
argument that the counts were intertwined. 
That the bribery charges were predicates for the 
RICO conspiracy further demonstrates that the “evidence 
for the different counts was sufficiently distinct to support 
the verdict on other separate counts.” Pelullo II, 14 F.3d at 
898. Regardless of the evidence pertaining solely to the 
RICO conviction, the evidence supporting both the bribery 
charges and the charges involving CUMA in Counts 19–
20 would have remained the same. 
The next factor we address is “whether the 
elimination of the count on which the defendant was 
invalidly convicted would have significantly changed the 
[defendant’s] strategy of the trial.” Id. As Vederman 
argues, “the RICO charge interfered with Vederman’s 
central defense to the bribery charge—that his gestures 
toward Fattah ‘were motivated purely by friendship.’ ” 
Vederman Reply Br. 28 (citing Gov’t Br. 200). In other 
words, the “RICO count made it dangerous to unduly 
emphasize [Vederman’s] close friendship” with Fattah. Id. 
From Vederman’s perspective, “a bribery-only trial would 
have reduced this danger and allowed a freer presentation 
of the defense.” Id. 
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It is quite likely that Vederman’s claim of friendship 
would have been less risky as a litigation strategy if he had 
not been facing a RICO charge. But Vederman 
nevertheless chose to take that risk and fully presented his 
friendship argument to the jury. Moreover, while 
Vederman’s reliance on friendship might have helped him 
defend against the bribery charges, that friendship would 
not have altered the evidence pertaining to Counts 19–20 
involving CUMA. Whether done for friendship or some 
other reason, submitting fraudulent information to a 
financial institution is unlawful. 
Finally, we “examine the charges, the language that 
the government used, and the evidence introduced during 
the trial to see whether they are ‘of the sort to arouse a 
jury.’ ” Pelullo II, 14 F.3d at 899 (quoting United States v. 
Ivic, 700 F.2d 51, 65 (2d Cir. 1983)). Vederman points out 
that Fattah was presented as “a backslapping, corrupt party 
boss,” with “predictable spillover to his friend and 
associate, Vederman.” Vederman Br. 50 (quoting United 
States v. Murphy, 323 F.3d 102, 118 (3d Cir. 2003)). But 
this description was of Fattah, not Vederman. Vederman 
cites other examples of prejudicial, pejorative language in 
the Government’s closing arguments. At one point, the 
Government referred to “conspirators engaged in what can 
only be described as a white collar crime spree from 
Philadelphia all the way to Washington, D.C.” and 
promised “to untangle the webs of lies and deception that 
these conspirators spun.” Vederman Br. 51 (quoting 
JA5295, 5297). Whatever rhetorical flair these words 
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contained, they did not obscure the evidence which 
independently supported the convictions for bank fraud at 
Count 19 and for making false statements to CUMA at 
Count 20. Accordingly, because we presume that the jury 
followed the District Court’s instruction to consider and to 
weigh separately the evidence on each count and as to each 
defendant, and because the evidence supporting the 
CUMA-related charges in Counts 19–20 is sufficiently 
distinct from the RICO conspiracy, we conclude that 
Vederman’s spillover argument is unavailing.38 
XII. Conclusion 
We will vacate the convictions of Chaka Fattah, Sr. 
and Herbert Vederman as to Counts 16, 17, 18, 22, and 23. 
                                              
38 Nicholas adopted “pertinent portions” of the prejudicial 
spillover arguments advanced by Vederman and Fattah. 
Nicholas Br. 65. Her spillover claim has no more merit 
than theirs. Nicholas’s involvement in the RICO 
conspiracy was distinct from the bribery charges, which 
did not unfairly influence the other counts. As to 
Nicholas’s assertion that the NOAA charges did not 
belong in the indictment and should have been tried 
separately, we fail to see how this relates to a claim of 
prejudicial spillover. To the extent it challenges the 
District Court’s denial of Nicholas’s motion for a 
severance, Nicholas has failed to provide legal support for 
such a contention. See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A); United 
States v. Irizarry, 341 F.3d 273, 305 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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Fattah and Vederman may be retried on these counts 
before a properly instructed jury. We will also reverse the 
District Court’s judgment of acquittal on Counts 19 and 
20. The convictions of Chaka Fattah, Sr. and Herbert 
Vederman will be reinstated, and the case will be 
remanded for sentencing on those counts. In all other 
respects, the judgments of the District Court will be 
affirmed. 
